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ABSTRACT: 
 
After the fall of the USSR the cultural identity of Russians in Estonia has experienced 
drastic changes. This study analyzes and systematizes these transformations within 
Manuel Castells‘ theory of resistance and project identity. Also the role of the media in 
identity construction is analyzed. The concepts of resistance and project identity are 
central to this research. Besides Manuel Castells‘ scheme the main theoretical 
framework includes Bernhard Giesen‘s concept of the media as identity constructor. 
Manfred Beller‘s notion of image, Geert Hofstede‘s theory of culture, and Stuart Hall‘s 
view of cultural identity are applied as supportive theoretical perspectives. 
 
The primary sources are media materials from Estonia and Russia. For their analysis 
Norman Fairclough‘s critical discourse method is used. The secondary sources consist 
of the materials on history of Estonia, Russia and the Russian minority in Estonia. 
 
The research suggests that Estonian Russians have two ways of cultural identity 
creation. The elder generation has constructed a form of resistance identity based on 
opposition to the dominant Estonian culture. This identity has also been created by the 
Russian media. Other Estonian Russians have chosen project identity, which tries to 
redefine their position in Estonian society. The media of Estonia and the Estonian 
Russian community play the major role in its construction. Both types of identity are 
manifested and constructed by the media. 
  
This study also revealed that both identity models have their problems. Resistance 
identity faces the suspicion of Estonians while project identity is also not always 
accepted as loyal to Estonia. At the same time project identity is more likely to solve the 
problem of the Russian minority in Estonia. 
_______________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Estonian Russians, Cultural Identity, Project Identity, Resistance 
Identity, the Media in Identity Construction 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The situation of the Russian minority in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is a broadly 
discussed and controversial issue. The image on Russians living in the Baltic region 
varies from the image of them being an oppressed people to that of them being 
occupiers of foreign countries, or a fifth column infiltrated and now maintained in those 
countries by Russia. Sometimes they are portrayed as simply a threat to the peaceful 
development of the local cultures. At the same time Baltic Russians themselves have a 
variety of self-images: some identify themselves with the culture of the local population 
and view themselves not as Russians but as Baltic Russians while others prefer to keep 
their Russianness safe and build up their cultural identity on the ties between them and 
the Russian Federation. This variety is in sharp contrast to the situation in the Soviet 
period when Russians in the Baltic region had a single dominant identity; to a major 
extent the transformations of their cultural identity took place in the 1990s after the 
collapse of the USSR. These changes are interesting and require thorough research. 
 
In this study attention will be paid to the mentioned transformations of Russians‘ 
identity. To be more precise, the focus will be not on the whole Baltic region but on 
Estonia, which is chosen because of its significant Russian minority and still acute 
problems connected to the Russian question. This research will study how Russians in 
Estonia reacted to the new conditions of life and how they transformed their cultural 
self-identification after the fall of the Soviet Union. The situation in Estonia is not 
unique: it is a general tendency of the Russian minorities in the post-Soviet space. 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
During the Soviet period Russians lived in all the republics of the USSR. The 
government promoted Russian migration since the integration and assimilation of the 
nations of the Soviet Union was seen as a part of the special Soviet identity-building 
(Tampere 2005: 144). This migration served other purposes as well: in some territories 
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the newcomers reconstructed the countries after World War II; in others they built up 
new industry. The ideological aim was associated with the notion of helping small 
republics to build communism. As a result of this policy significant Russian 
communities emerged in almost all parts of the USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
was a hard blow to their position, as the members of these communities suddenly turned 
from citizens of the USSR to stateless inhabitants of independent foreign countries. 
Approximately 25 million ethnic Russians were left in the ―Near Abroad‖ (Castells 
1998: 255). Many Russians outside the borders of the RSFSR (the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic) had to rebuild their life under the new circumstances. 
 
In the 1990s the Russian minorities faced the challenge of adaptation to the changed 
situation. In Ukraine and Belarus the changes were fairly painless owing to the common 
roots of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians, their common history, and the relative 
similarity of their languages (Rywkin 2003: 5). Nevertheless, Ukraine and Belarus are 
not the only parts of the collapsed federation in which the significant Russian 
population is represented. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the sizable Russian 
communities have to adapt to the environment, which drastically differs from that of 
Russia. In some Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics the adaptation is impeded 
not only by vivid otherness of their traditional life but also by the anti-Russian ethnic 
upheavals, riots and terrorism. In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the situation is not so 
acute; the dominant population does not make a practice of riots and purges of Russians, 
but nevertheless the process of Russian adaptation to the new conditions is very 
difficult. 
 
All three countries faced considerable inflows of Russians after becoming the parts of 
the USSR in 1940. During the Soviet period the particular identity of Estonian, Latvian, 
and Lithuanian nations was viewed as ―a part of the ‗bad past‘ ― (Tampere 2005: 144). 
The collapse of the Soviet Union enabled Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to return to their 
pre-Soviet cultural practices. However, in the 1990s the policy of securing their cultures 
higher status was to a certain extent obstructed by the sheer scale of Russian 
communities within the national borders.  
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In the case of Estonia this minority, representing Russian but not Estonian culture and 
language, was perceived as a potential threat to the revival of the national cultural 
practices (Tampere 2005: 161-162). Therefore, in the 1990s some protective measures 
were made by the Estonian government. The most well-known of them were ethnic 
citizenship, and residence and language requirements for receiving the full set of 
Constitutional rights. Under these circumstances Estonian Russians had to re-build their 
once dominant identity. The loss of their dominant status was a fact of life, and the 
transformations of the cultural identity (the movement towards specific Estonian 
Russian identity) were accepted by the Estonian Russian minority. From the early 1990s 
onwards Russians in Estonia had to choose whether to identify with the Russian 
Federation or Estonia. The process of new identity construction was strongly influenced 
by the media of both Estonia and Russia as well as by the minority itself.  
 
 
1.2 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyze and systematize the Estonian Russian minority 
cultural identity transformations within the chosen theoretical framework of Manuel 
Castells‘ identity concept. More specifically, the major focus of the study will be on the 
transformations which can be defined as resistance and project identity construction: the 
first maintains the survival of a group‘s specificity under unfriendly conditions, while 
the second leads to building a new identity. At the same time the role of the media in 
these two types of identity creation will be analyzed. 
 
 
1.3 Material and Method 
 
Since this work will analyze the transformations of Estonian Russian cultural identity 
and the role of the media in identity construction it is necessary to use the media as a 
source of the study. At the same time it is vital to pay attention to the history of 
Estonian-Russian interaction and the Russian community in Estonia in order to 
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understand the background of the identity transformations. The list of applied sources 
can be divided into the primary and secondary ones. 
 
The primary sources are those elements of the print media in Estonia and Russia, which 
reflect the contemporary situation of the Russian minority from different perspectives 
and are one of the significant instruments of Estonian Russian cultural identity 
construction. The whole mass of the applied media materials can be divided into three 
subgroups. The first one includes the newspapers of the Russian community in Estonia: 
Molodoj Estonii [Estonian Youth], MK-Estonia, Stolitsa [The Capital] etc. The second 
subgroup consists of the Estonian newspapers such as Eesti Päevaleht [Estonian Daily 
Paper], Eesti Ekspress [Estonian Express] etc. The third subgroup comprises the 
newspapers published in the Russian Federation. The following papers belong to this 
category: Argumenty i Fakty [Arguments and Facts], Izvestia [The News], 
Komsomolskaya Pravda [Komsomolsk Truth] etc. Unless otherwise mentioned, all 
translations of quoted primary sources are my own. 
 
The secondary sources can be divided into three subgroups as well. The first represents 
the materials on the history of Russia and the Soviet Union. It includes such works as 
Wolfgand Mitter and Leonid Novikov‘s Educational Policy and Minority Issues in the 
Soviet Union (1985), Nicholas Riasanovsky‘s A History of Russia (1969) and many 
others. The second subgroup are the materials on the history of Estonia such as Aivar 
Kriiska‘s and Andreas Tvaur‘s Viron esihistoria (2007), Toivo Miljan‘s Historical 
dictionary of Estonia (2004), Raivo Vetik‘s Inter-Ethnic Relations in Estonia 1988-
1998 (1999) etc. The third subgroup consists of the works on Estonian Russians‘ 
history. To this group belongs Elmira Fedosova‘s article Ot beglyh staroverov k 
gosudarstvennoi kolonisatsii. Formirovanie russkoi diaspory v Pribaltike (XVIII-XIX 
vv.) [From the refugees the Old Believers to the State Colonization. Construction of the 
Russian diaspora in the Baltic region (17th-19th centuries)] (2009), article Pravoslavie 
na Estonskoi zemle [The Russian Orthodoxy in Estonia] (2009), Kaja Tampere‘s article 
From Majority to Minority: Changes of Ideologies, Changes of Identities (2005) etc.  
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The latter article is one of the most significant secondary sources used in the actual 
research since Kaja Tampere focuses on the history of the Estonian Russian minority in 
the 1990s and pays special attention to the identity transformations taking place in that 
period.  My work owes a great deal to this article, with some reservations will be 
apparent. Tampere is quite optimistic towards the future of Russians in Estonia and 
views their integration into Estonian society as inevitable. His article was published in 
2005, two years before the Bronze Night (Russian riots in 2007), which has drastically 
changed the situation. Nevertheless, in spite of this problem Tampere‘s research is quite 
relevant to this study. 
 
Since in this work media materials will be studied, elements of the method of Norman 
Fairclough‘s critical discourse analysis of the media have been chosen as the most 
suitable. Nevertheless, concentration on the linguistic elements of the analyzed text 
which this method presumes is not so significant for this research and will not be paid 
attention to while applying the method. This analysis focuses on the communicative 
event and the associated order of discourse (Fairclough 1995: 54–56).  
 
Fairclough (1995: 54-56) defines discourse as ―spoken or written language use‖. 
According to him, language use is always constitutive of social identities, social 
relations and a system of knowledge and belief; any text makes its contribution to 
shaping these aspects of society and culture (ibid. 55). The critical discourse analysis 
approach considers the discursive practices of the community – its normal ways of 
using language – in terms of networks which Fairclough calls ‗orders of discourse‘ 
(ibid.). He notes that social and cultural events often manifest themselves discursively 
―through a redrawing of boundaries within and between the orders of discourse‖ (ibid.). 
In this research the cultural events of the 1990s (the collapse of Soviet Man‘s cultural 
identity, re-establishment of the local Estonian identity and so on) are discussed. 
Therefore, this redrawing of boundaries and discursive manifestation is central to my 
critical discourse analysis.  
 
As the current research focuses on the transformations of Estonian Russians‘ cultural 
identity, which are often manifested in the media, the analysis of media discourse is 
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necessary. Fairclough‘s critical discourse analysis includes the analysis of the 
relationship between the text, discourse practice (various aspects of text production and 
reception) and sociocultural practice (situational context or the wider frame of the 
society and culture). The order of discourse is analyzed in terms of its structure and 
relationship to other orders. Nevertheless, for our research this aspect is less significant 
than the analysis of communicative event, and while working with media materials we 
will not look at their order of discourse. Thus, if an article on Estonian Russians‘ 
cultural identity is analyzed, the focus will be only on the communicative event: the 
context of the actual article (Estonian Russians in post-Soviet Estonia), the rhetorics of 
the text (language methods of acceptance or contrast – such as ―we‖ or ―they‖ referring 
to the Estonian Russian minority etc.) and some aspects of the way the article is 
received (its influence on minority identity formation). 
 
  
1.4 Work Structure 
 
This work is divided into five chapters. The first chapter focuses on the theoretical 
framework of the research and its basic concepts. The second concentrates on the 
history of Russians in Estonia before the period of the Soviet governance (the 11th 
century-1939) and from the period of the Soviet presence to the Estonian independence 
(1940-1991). The second chapter also focuses upon the issue of Soviet Russians‘ 
legitimizing identity in Estonia. The third chapter pays attention to the measures of re-
establishment of the Estonian cultural identity independence in the post-Soviet period. 
The sudden change of geopolitical situation allowed the nation to revive its cultural 
practices after the decades of the Soviet presence. The fourth and fifth chapters describe 
the transformation of Estonian Russian cultural identity in terms of resistance and 
project identity. The conclusion gives the main results of the research.  
 
This study will analyze the transformations of Estonian Russians‘ cultural identity 
taking place in the 1990s. I will apply Manuel Castells‘ tripartite notion of collective 
identity (as divisible into legitimizing, resistance and project identity) to systematize 
these changes. I will also use Fairclough‘s method of critical discourse analysis to work 
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with the primary sources – the media materials. The media have played a significant 
role in these transformations and have to be analyzed. Next, however, it is necessary to 
explain the general theoretical framework and to define the core concepts. 
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND BASIC CONCEPTS 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical framework of the research at hand. As the study 
concentrates on the issue of cultural identity, I will define the key concepts related to 
that notion. Culture and identity have been given innumerous over the years. Therefore 
it is necessary to clarify how the concepts will be treated here.  
 
There are many theories which give their particular definitions to the term culture. For 
this research I will use the concept of Geert Hofstede (2005: 4), who defines culture as 
―the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or 
category of people from others‖. It is always a collective phenomenon because it is 
shared with people from the same social environment. According to this theory, culture 
is manifested through symbols, heroes, rituals, and values (ibid. 6–7).  
 
Symbols are words, gestures, pictures, or objects which carry some specific meaning 
only recognized by those who share one culture (Hofstede 2005: 7). New symbols can 
be easily developed, while the older ones can disappear; one culture can copy the 
symbols of the others (ibid.). Another element of culture manifestation is heroes. They 
are persons (real and imagined) who possess characteristics which are valued by the 
culture. Besides symbols and heroes, culture is manifested through rituals which are 
collective activities, superfluous to reaching desired aims, but which are viewed as a 
socially essential by the culture. The list of rituals includes various social and religious 
ceremonies and discourses – the way of a language use in communication. The last 
element of cultural manifestation consists of values. They are broad tendencies of 
preference of certain states of affair over others. The theory of Geert Hofstede has been 
chosen because this definition of culture suits to the situation of Russian culture in 
Estonia: the collective programming of mind which distinguishes Russians from 
Estonians, and which is manifested through the particular Russian values, rituals, 
symbols, and heroes. It is also necessary to define the notion of cultural identity.  
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According to Stuart Hall (1990), there are two definitions of cultural identity. Firstly, it 
can be defined in terms of belonging to one shared culture. It is ―a sort of collective ‗one 
true self‘, hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed ‗selves‘, 
which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common‖ (ibid.). Within this 
definition people‘s cultural identity reflects the common historical experiences and 
shared cultural codes which provide the individuals as ―one people‖ with stable frames 
of reference and meaning beneath people‘s actual history (ibid.). This ―oneness‖ 
underlies all the other, more superficial differences. Thus, cultural identity can be 
viewed as a collective, shared history.  
 
Secondly, another definition of cultural identity is built not only upon the points of 
similarity, but also the points of difference. These differences ―constitute ‗what we 
really are‘; or rather – since history has intervened – ‗what we have become‘ ‖ (Hall 
1990). Through these differences the uniqueness of ―oneness‖ is constituted. In this 
definition cultural identity is a matter of ―becoming‖ as well as ―being‖; it belongs both 
to the future and to the past. In that sense the cultural identity comes from somewhere, 
has its own history, and undergoes constant transformations (ibid.). It is subject to the 
continuous ―play‖ of history, culture and power. 
 
This type of definition has been chosen due to the fact that the cultural identity of 
Russians in Estonia in fact is based on the sense of common Russianness on the one 
hand, and on the history of their constant transformation on the other. Estonian 
Russians‘ cultural identity depends on the historical changes which have shaped its 
uniqueness. The influence of these transformations led me to use Manuel Castells‘ 
typology of identity to demonstrate what stages the cultural identity of Russians in 
Estonia has passed. 
 
In conducting this study I have applied as a main theoretical background Manuel 
Castells‘ (1997: 8) concept of distinction between three possible forms of collective 
identity. As Castells writes, there can be legitimizing identity, resistance identity, and 
project identity. The first is introduced to extend and rationalize one‘s group domination 
in a particular society.  Legitimizing identity generates a set of organizations and 
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institutions, as well as organized social actors who reproduce the identity that 
rationalizes structural domination. Resistance identity is generated by the people who 
see themselves as oppressed and/or stigmatized by the dominant group. The aim of 
resistance identity is to maintain their survival in this position and fight for their own 
specificity against imposed principles. The third, project identity, is related to a new 
identity which defines one‘s position, but also plans transforming the prevailing social 
structure. The theory of Castells also can be related to other notions of identity. 
 
Castells (1997: 7) perceives identity not as something given, but as something 
constructed during a human being‘s life: ―The construction of identity uses building 
materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and 
reproductive institutions, from collective memories and from personal fantasies‖ (ibid.). 
Thus, one‘s identity can be constructed and transformed using the building materials 
mentioned. Stuart Hall‘s (1990) concept of cultural identity as undergoing constant 
transformations on the basis of history, culture, and power also expresses the similar 
opinion on the identity‘s changeable character. Thus, the theory of Hall supplements 
and supports Castells‘ main theory of this research. It is vital to admit that Castells 
applies his scheme to social processes, and refers to a social identity.  
 
Moreover, while working with Castells‘ theory it is necessary to remember Ting-
Toomey‘s distinction between primary and situational identity. The primary one 
includes cultural, ethnic, gender and personal identity (Ting-Toomey 1999: 29). The 
situational one includes role, relation, and symbolic interaction identity (ibid.). Manuel 
Castells (1997: 6–7) emphasizes that roles and identity are different things: roles are 
defined by the norms of social institutions, and their meaning depends on the 
arrangements between individuals and these institutions, while identities are sources of 
meaning for the social actors themselves. In this research the focus is on primary 
identity – the cultural one – not on the roles. Manuel Castells‘ scheme of legitimizing, 
resistance and project identity forms corresponds quite well to the situation of the 
Russian minority in Estonia, as its cultural identity has gone through all three positions 
of Castells‘ theory.  
 
 15 
 
After the beginning of the Soviet presence, Russian cultural identity in Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania suddenly achieved the status of legitimizing identity. This one was 
introduced to extend and rationalize Russians‘ domination in the local societies. Their 
identity was promoted by the official power, and their dominance over the local 
population was extended through the policy of russification. More specifically, it was 
not Russians who had to study Estonian, but Estonians who had to study Russian. Then 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union the status of the legitimizing identity was returned 
to Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian cultural identity. Russians reached the stage of 
resistance and project identity.  
 
On the one hand, some proportion of the Russian minority in Estonia can be viewed as 
organizing collective resistance against Estonianisation of the country on the basis of 
their own Russian cultural identity. New conditions of life are perceived by them in 
terms of exclusion, and a threat to them and their culture. At the same time these 
conditions have made Russians feel pride in their own culture and identity, to tighten 
bounds between each other, to call the Russian Federation to their protection. 
Nevertheless, the choice of a project identity has also found its own supporters within 
the Russian community. 
 
Not all the representatives of the Russian minority in Estonia wish to resist the new 
governmental policy of Estonianisation. Some of them have decided to construct a 
project identity which is intended to redefine their position in society and the society 
itself. They do not wish to be entirely assimilated by Estonian culture so as to lose their 
cultural identity. Neither do they want to simply resist their new minority position in the 
Estonian community. Thus, they prefer to accept the policy of Estonianisation (learning 
the national language, acquaintance with Estonian culture, receiving citizenship of the 
state) but at the same time to remain Russians. This group of people has created the 
non-traditional cultural identity in which the interwoven elements of Russian and 
Estonian cultures are involved. This project identity can transform the whole situation 
within Estonian society, which has a problem of tension between Estonians and 
Russians. 
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In this work special attention will be paid to the role of the media in the construction of 
Estonian Russian cultural identity. Bernhard Giesen (1996: 11–12) notes that the media 
is an important constructor of identity. He defines the media ―as a cultural practice that 
is not just a mechanism guaranteeing of a nation‘s cultural identity, but also a process 
through which identity is created‖ (Tampere 2005: 168). Thus, the media of Estonia and 
the Russian Federation play a significant role in the process of Estonian Russian 
identity-building. They create and popularize the image of Russians in Estonia; this 
image is given to the Estonian Russian community as an object of identification. At the 
same time Estonian Russians themselves construct their image through their own media 
as an intermediary. 
 
It is necessary to explain the meaning of ―image‖ in this study. As Manfred Beller 
writes (2007: 4), image can be understood as a mental silhouette of the other, who 
appear to be determined by the characteristics of family, group, tribe or race. This image 
rules one‘s opinion of others and controls one‘s behavior towards them (ibid.). In this 
research the image has to be perceived as not only a mental silhouette of the other, but 
also a mental silhouette of the self, since the Estonian Russians‘ image is created not 
only by the Estonian and the Russian media; the Estonian Russian media also takes part 
in this image-creation, and reflects the people‘s self-image.  
 
The concept of perception is related to the image. Beller defines perception as a ―way of 
seeing and judging‖ (Beller 2007: 4). He notes that members of different groups 
perceive matters from their specific, distinctive perspective, and calls this phenomenon 
a ―selective perception‖. As a result of this perception judgments are made on the basis 
of perceiver‘s point of view which is called ―selective evaluation‖ (ibid. 5). This theory 
suits the situation of the media role in Estonian Russian identity creation: both Russian, 
Estonian and Estonian Russian newspapers create the image of the Russian community 
in Estonia, while the readers perceive and judge this image from their particular 
perspective.  
 
On the whole, the theoretical framework of this work draws on Manuel Castells‘ 
tripartite scheme of identity: legitimizing, resistance and project identity. Bernhard 
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Giesen‘s notion of the media as a constructor of identity also is a primary theory of the 
study. Stuart Hall‘s theory of cultural identity, Geert Hofstede‘s concept of culture, and 
Manfred Beller‘s notions of image and perception are used as the supplementary 
theories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
3 HISTORY OF RUSSIANS IN ESTONIA 
 
 
The territory of modern Estonia was inhabited by its local people in approximately 9000 
BCE (Zetterberg 2007: 23). Estonians made the great westward trek from the Ural 
mountains to reach the territory of present-day Estonia (Laar 1992: 1). Their name Eesti 
comes from the Roman historian Tacitus‘ term Aestii – the tribe living on the shore of 
the Baltic Sea (Tacitus 1998: 23). The language of Estonians belongs to the Balto-
Finnic branch of the Finno-Ugric group of languages. 
 
While studying Estonian Russian cultural identity one can look at the long and rich 
history of Russians‘ existence in Estonia. The first Russian settlements appeared in the 
land in the 11th century. Russian migration was slow and gradual, but its basis was 
successfully created. Russians and Estonians began to interact with each other from this 
period onwards. Russian rulers made some efforts to dominate Estonia. 
 
 
3.1 History of Russians in Estonia before the Soviet period 
 
In 1030 Russian prince Yaroslav the Wise founded in Estonia the town called Jurjev 
(Yurijev). The latter was built on the place of the ancient Estonian stronghold Tarbatu 
(Tartu) (Kriiska & Tvauri 2007: 170). Thus, a vassal dependence of the land on Russia 
was established. In 1224 Jurjev was captured by German crusaders.  
 
An important cultural element of Russian migration to Estonia was religion. Russians 
founded not only towns and fortresses, but also churches and monasteries. The first 
Russian Orthodox churches in Estonia were built in the 11th century (Miljan 2004: 
420). The spread of the Russian Orthodoxy in the country was quite peaceful 
(Pravoslavie na Estonskoi zemle 2009). Nevertheless, the number of Estonian adherents 
remained fairly low. The Estonian population was entirely Christianized only in the 
13th century by German, Danish, and Swedish crusaders (Miljan 2004: 204). Thus, the 
religious influence of Russians was limited and short-term. The German knights‘ 
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invasion put an end not only to Russian rule. Nevertheless, there still existed a third way 
of Russian expansion in Estonia – at this particular moment not through direct conquest 
or conversion but through trade.  
 
From the second half of the 13th century close trade relations between Russia and the 
Western Europe led to the establishment of the Russian settlements in Estonia. It was 
the natural intermediary between Europe and Russia. Russian merchants carried their 
goods through Estonia and settled there. These settlements promoted contacts between 
Russians and Estonians.  
 
The Russian settlements in Estonia faced a serious challenge of war. In the 16th century 
the Livonian war (1558-1583) began. Russia attempted to capture the Baltic region. 
This military conflict changed the position of the Russian community in Estonia. As a 
result of the first victories the major part of Estonia was captured by Russian forces, and 
for some period was a part of the Russian state. Nevertheless, Russian rule over the land 
ended after the end of the Livonian war. 
 
The results of the Livonian war were not successful for Russia. According to the peace 
treaties in 1582 Russia had to leave all the Baltic territories: its army and settlers had to 
be withdrawn from the region. Thus, the Livonian war almost eliminated the Russian 
settlements in Estonia. However, quite soon the state of affairs was changed due to the 
flow of refugees from Russia. 
 
At the end of the 16th century Russian serfs began to flee to the Baltic region from the 
oppression by their landlords. Some of them came to Estonia. These serfs were not only 
refugees from Russia. Another group of coming people were the so-called starovery 
[the Old Believers]. They were the followers of the Russian Orthodox Church who 
resisted the church reforms in Russia. The Baltic region as a safe haven from oppression 
was chosen due to its population‘s tolerance of the refugees‘ religious views (Miljan 
2004: 421).  
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The sudden change of state of affairs in Estonia came with the Great Northern War 
(1700-1721) of Russia. The victory of the Russian Empire meant the beginning of 
Russian domination over the Baltic region (1721-1918). According to the Treaty of 
Nystadt in 1721 Russia acquired Estonia (Riasanovsky 1969: 249). Russian migration to 
the region took the form of an official full-scale colonization of the received province. 
Russians arrived in Estonia as the legal state settlers from the first years of Russian 
domination (ibid). 
 
Nevertheless, if we compare this province with the other regions of the Russian Empire, 
we can note that Russians did not entirely dominate in society. As in the Grand Duchy 
of Finland the non-Russian aristocracy and merchants (Germans in that case) still 
remained influential.  Often they were more influential than the newcomers from Russia 
(Fedosova 2009). However, some limitations of former competition with German 
merchants placed less obstacles in the path of Russians.  
 
The 19th century was a century of Estonian russification. Hoyer (1993: 97) writes that 
―the very first measures towards russification were taken during the 1830s‖. The czars 
wanted to tighten the ties between the centre and the periphery; the same processes took 
place also in the other Baltic provinces and in the Grand Duchy of Finland. Russian as a 
language was introduced into Estonian school system. The first Russian textbooks for 
Estonian children were printed. In the period of the 1840s-1860s approximately 60 000 
Estonians were baptized by the Russian Orthodox church (Fedosova 2009). 
Nevertheless, the main stage of russification began in the 1880s. Miljan (2004: 423) 
writes that ―Russian was mandated as the language of all public administration, and of 
instruction in all schools including the University of Tartu‖. The majority of teachers 
and civil servants were replaced by the loyal Russians or at least the pro-Russian 
Estonians. The Estonian newspapers had either to speak in favor of this policy or avoid 
the topic altogether for fear of being closed down (Hoyer 1993: 96).  
 
This process of russification was intended by the imperial authorities to ―break both the 
privileges of the Baltic nobility and thus the separatist status of the Baltic provinces‖ 
(Miljan 2004: 423). The same processes of cutting the privileges of the local aristocracy 
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also took place in such regions as Poland and Finland; Russian rulers wished to weaken 
the anti-imperial Polish nobility and the Swedish upper class in the Grand Duchy of 
Finland (ibid.).  
 
The imperial measures of strengthening the ties between Russia and Estonia led to the 
gradual turning of Estonians toward their language and national cultural values in a way 
unexpected by the Russian authorities. According to Jansen (2004: 88), ―active 
proponents of an Estonian society began to develop an Estonian-language 
communication network‖. Some Estonian newspapers, publishing and cultural societies 
were created as a response to schools with the Russian language of instruction. Miljan 
(2004: 423) suggests that russification supported the national awakening of Estonians. 
The coming events brought drastic changes in the Russian and Estonian position in 
Estonia. 
 
The revolution of 1917 and the collapse of the Russian Empire influenced the Russian 
communities in the Baltic region. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became independent 
states. The civil war in Russia led to the flow of refugees from the land. Approximately 
15 000-18 000 Russian emigrés stayed in Estonia (Eliseeva 2009). The growth of the 
Russian community of the country after the revolution was mainly caused not by the 
wave of emigrés but by the change of the borders between Russia and Estonia in the 
1920s. 
 
According to the Soviet-Estonian treaty of Tartu in 1920, Estonia received the territories 
where approximately 40 000 Russians lived. Due to this territorial growth Estonia in 
1922 had a Russian population of 92 000 people, 8.2 per cent of the country‘s total 
population (Miljan 2004: 421). Thus, the Russian community began to live in the 
sovereign state of Estonia. Despite some initial conflicts with Estonians the Russian 
minority managed to adapt to the changed conditions of life.  
 
The life of the Estonian Russian community in the 1920s-1930s was relatively stable. 
On the one hand, the adaptation to new conditions demanded some efforts from 
Russians. On the other hand, the Estonian government took measures which secured the 
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position of the minority in the country. The Law on Cultural Autonomy of 1925 gave 
Estonian Russians the right to establish their cultural associations which could organize, 
administer, and monitor public and private educational institutions in the minority 
native language (Miljan 2004: 161).  
 
The Estonian state decided to ease the Russian adaptation through the measures of the 
Estonian language learning. In 1922 the presence of the Estonian language in the study 
program became the obligatory requirement for school registration (Eliseeva 2009). In 
the 1920s-1930s the national language learning was thoroughly organized in all Russian 
schools of Estonia. On the whole, the level of Estonian teaching in Russian schools was 
high. Nevertheless, the study suggests that Estonian Russians, while adapting to the new 
conditions, did not want to lose their Russian cultural identity through full integration 
(Isakov 2003). 
 
In the 1920s-1930s the Russian minority in Estonia took the measures to secure its 
cultural allegiance. For a significant part of emigrés and Estonian Russians the entire 
denial of their Russianness was the same as the betrayal of their motherland (Isakov 
2003). The cultural activities of the Russian community were promoted. Russians 
organized song festivals, popularized Russian culture among their young people, and 
published Russian books and magazines (Eliseeva 2009).  
 
Thus, Estonian Russians avoided full integration into Estonian society, and as far as one 
can understand one of the major reasons was their fear of forgetting their Russianness in 
case of the integration. They adapted to the new Estonian environment, but all their 
cultural activities demonstrated that Russian culture still existed, and they still belonged 
to it. On the other hand, the Estonian population tolerated the Russian community. 
―This ethnic Russian share in the Estonian population was considered indigenous by 
Estonians and remained constant‖ (Miljan 2004: 421). The future drastically changed 
the position of the Russian community in Estonia, and the position of Estonians 
themselves. These transformations were closely connected to the Soviet domination 
over the region which began in 1939. The Soviet presence meant the new cultural 
identity of both groups of the land citizens. 
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The Russian minority in Estonia had a long history, but the specificity of the modern 
Estonian Russian cultural identity was established mainly after the beginning of the 
Soviet presence. Nevertheless, the pre-Soviet history can be studied to demonstrate that 
the interaction between the two nations began quite early, and their mutual relations 
were not as bad as many modern Estonian researchers (Miljan, Talvet, Vetik etc.) 
presume. In the next sub-chapter attention will be concentrated on the position of the 
Russian minority under Soviet rule. 
 
 
3.2 Position of the Russian minority in Estonia under Soviet rule. Legitimizing identity 
 
The policy of the Soviet Union played more significant role in constructing the cultural 
identity of the Estonian Russian than imperial policy. The authorities of the Russian 
Empire frequently did not take special care of Russians living in the Baltic provinces, 
and did not take influential measures for their cultural identity promotion. The measures 
of russification were taken only at the end of the 19th century, and although their scale 
was planned to be big, the actual implementation did not strongly change the position of 
Russians in Estonia. Ironically, true russification was conducted by Soviet leaders who 
used in their propaganda sound claims of equal respect to all nations of the USSR. The 
study suggests that Soviet russification suddenly made Russian cultural identity 
legitimizing. 
 
According to Manuel Castells (1997: 8), legitimizing identity is introduced by the 
dominant group of a society to extend and rationalize its domination – thus, in the 
Soviet period Russian cultural identity was introduced by the new masters of Estonia to 
explain the reasons for their domination over the local people, and to spread their 
power. The cultural policy of the USSR in the region tried to make the cultural identity 
of Russian group legitimizing. New education programs in Estonia concentrated on the 
achievements of Russian culture, almost completely ignoring the ones of Estonia. The 
history of Estonian culture was thus re-written to make an impression that only Russians 
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were its major benefactors. Almost all measures in the cultural sphere promoted the 
position of Russian cultural identity. These measures will be described later, but now 
attention will be paid to the changes in the structure of the Estonian Russian minority 
after the beginning of the Soviet presence. 
 
In the 1940s the major part of the old Russian community faced purges by the NKVD 
(People‘s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the Soviet secret security organization) 
(Estonia 1940-1945: Reports of the Estonian International Commission for the 
Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity 2006: 312). Thus, the community of 
Russians who peacefully coexisted with the local people in independent Estonia was 
purged – it was not eliminated altogether but it became weakened and intimidated. Due 
to Soviet migration policy a new Russian community in the country was created. 
 
The leaders of the Soviet Union promoted Russian migration to Estonia. In 1945-1991 
the Russian population grew from 23 000 to approximately 475 000 people (Chin & 
Kaiser 1996: 97). A majority of the newcomers consisted of workers who were to 
contribute to the industrial development of Estonia. At the same time soldiers and 
officers of the Red Army were also sent to Estonia to maintain the security. The new 
Russian minority appearing in unfamiliar country with unfamiliar conditions of life 
began to create a new cultural identity according to the policy of Soviet leaders. 
 
This study suggests that the cultural identity of the old Russian community was as 
dispersed, multifaceted and heterogeneous as the Russian community itself. From the 
peasants and the Old Believers to Orthodox noblemen the borders of the Russian 
minority were drawn (Fedosova 2009). We can see that these groups commonly created 
their own cultural identity and avoided being united. Moreover, the cultural identity of 
the local population was kept safe. Despite the czarist government making attempts to 
conduct the policy of russification in the country, it never pretended to eliminate 
Estonian cultural identity altogether, it never considered Estonian culture to be 
something dangerous to the empire. Soviet rule changed the situation – on the one hand, 
leaders of the USSR did not wish to entirely destroy the local cultural practices; on the 
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other, they decided to free a place for Russian dominating culture in order to tighten the 
ties between the centre and the periphery. 
 
As it had been in the czarist age, russification of the remote provinces was still used as a 
means of strangling potential local separatism and strengthening relations between 
Moscow and the periphery. Any memories about the independence of Estonia and its 
culture (as far as one can understand the logic of Soviet leaders) might be a ground for 
future separatist tendencies; therefore, through criticizing of sovereignty cultural 
remnants and the spreading of Russian culture one could promote the idea of the 
impossibility of Estonian separate existence. Despite the fact that in Constitution there 
was the union republic‘s formal right to secede from the USSR, Soviet policy of 
maintaining all-Union integrity made it clear that Soviet leaders would not allow 
Estonia to restore its independence (Miljan 2004: 147). The process of russification was 
also related to the utopian dreams of the USSR leadership about the communist society 
without national and cultural differences. 
 
In 1972 the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, announced 
the beginning of a new historical period of creation of the Soviet people – people of the 
new internationalist culture (Miljan 2004: 424). The objective of this ambitious task was 
to assimilate all the nations of the Soviet Union into a homogeneous Russian-speaking 
mass and to build up the New Soviet man, who would not be burdened with any 
national feelings (ibid.). Thus, any national identities, excluding Russian, were clearly 
the obstacles in the path to the New Soviet man. Therefore, for Soviet leaders it was 
vital to make Estonians to forget about their country‘s sovereignty.  
 
Leaders of the Soviet Union did not want to allow any memories of the 22-year 
sovereignty to be made public and tried to criticize them. Soviet leaders justified their 
actions as a struggle against fascism and capitalism (Tannberg 2005). The measures 
included purges of some Estonian cultural figures, the undervaluing of some cultural 
objects such as national literature, theatre, monuments, and propaganda about the 
allegedly inferior character of Estonian culture during the independent period. Some 
national poets and playwrights were arrested and sent to Siberia, some fled from 
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Estonia. The Estonian theatre institute and the Artist Institute of Tartu were closed 
(Miljan 2004:424). In the universities the departments of Estonian history were 
abolished (ibid.). In the school system the national history was reduced to a minor 
subject. By the end of 1940, all the newspapers of the independence period were 
abolished in Estonia (Hoyer 1993: 164). The mass media of the Estonian Soviet 
Republic became the strictly controlled means of pro-Soviet propaganda whose aim was 
to shape the Estonian public mind to believe in the benefactors of the elder brother – the 
Russian people. 
 
The sphere of Estonian art had to be re-shaped according to the will of Soviet leaders. 
―Those whose work was influenced by national traditions were charged with the sin of 
nationalism‖ (Hoyer 1993: 182). Special bodies maintained obedience to Moscow. 
Glavlit [The Main Literature Committee] performed the functions of a censor. The same 
organizations as Glavlit existed in other spheres of art; thus, Estonian culture was 
developed according to the USSR patterns to suppress the memory of its short-term 
independence. The process of its ideological discredit was launched. 
 
We can feel that the main aim of Soviet propaganda was to prove that Estonian culture 
of the independent republic was a slave of capitalism; Estonian identity in general was 
portrayed as a part of the ―bad past‖, representing the ―bad days‖ and ―not trendy in the 
new and progressive Soviet society‖ (Tampere 2005: 144). On the one hand, we can 
admit that pre-annexation Estonia was a capitalist state, and that fact had some influence 
on its culture. On the other hand, in 1918-1940 Estonian culture actively developed, and 
this period was fruitful for it, because the government supported its development 
(Weidemann 2009). The spheres of science and education concentrated on issues of the 
Estonian language, history and literature. However, my study suggests that Soviet 
propaganda interpreted the period of 1918-1940 as something bad, and the desire to feel 
oneself Estonian rather than Soviet was condemned in Soviet society. Thus, the place 
for promoting Russian cultural identity in Estonia was free since the competing 
Estonian culture was undervalued and criticized by the propaganda. Soviet rulers began 
to shape the cultural identification of the Russian minority in Estonia. They wanted to 
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make it the dominating, legitimizing identity. The research revealed that the Communist 
Party arranged a full-scale agitation campaign of Russians‘ status promotion. 
 
Firstly, one measure of the Soviet policy towards the cultural identity of the Russian 
minority was the rise in self-esteem of this minority. Books, articles, and films viewed 
Russians in Estonia very positively. For instance, in the 1940s new Estonian writers 
such as Hans Leberecht, August Jakobsoon, Juhan Smuul touched the topics of 
Estonia‘s transformation into the union republic, the Great Patriotic war, life in the 
Soviet Estonian rural areas, and glorified Russians as great heroes: liberators and 
benefactors. New history programs in Estonian schools and universities also created an 
idealized picture of Russians. 
 
According to the official Soviet point of view, Russians and their culture always 
brought Estonia peace and florescence. Ironically, even the period of czarist rule 
(despite the fact that it was publicly condemned in the USSR) was described as 
something good for Estonia. On the one hand, Russians had quite a soft policy towards 
Estonia, and the official point of view was not totally wrong. Under the rule of the 
Russian Empire, Estonia was in a better position than many other provinces of Russia. 
According to Fedosova (2009), its population had more civil liberties than ordinary 
Russians, and its national elite was kept safe.  
 
On the other hand, we note that the official point of view to a significant extent ignored 
the facts that Russians waged wars to conquer Estonia or conducted the policy of 
russification, which was negative to Estonians. Consequently, the Soviet picture of 
Russians‘ role was an idealization of history: the positive side of the Russian rule was 
emphasized, while its negative side was hidden. At the same time, Russian culture was 
portrayed as the contributor of Estonian successful development, whereas German or 
Swedish cultures were viewed as oppressing ones. In fact, in some cases Swedes and 
Germans had a tougher policy towards Estonian culture than Russians (Miljan 2004: 
65). For instance, they baptized Estonians by force and imposed German or Swedish 
cultures on them, while Russians made less effort to impose Russian culture. 
Nevertheless, Russians also had a tough policy and could not be idealized. Under the 
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Russian Empire, Estonia faced russification, which resulted in better opportunities for 
Russians. However, Soviet propaganda did not show the multi-faceted picture of 
Russians‘ influence and concentrated on the positive side. The results of the Soviet 
policy of promotion were simple – the Russian minority of Estonia was proud of its own 
culture, and happily identified itself with such a splendid image. 
 
Soviet propaganda was quite successful. Being proud of one‘s own culture is a natural 
phenomenon, but Russians sometimes did not only take pride in their own Russianness 
but also perceived the national Estonian culture as something lower than the Russian 
one as the consequence of a decades-long agitation by the USSR. Their identity was 
made legitimizing. As Castells (1997: 8) states, this form of identity of the dominant 
society group or institution rationalizes its dominating status in the community. In the 
Soviet period one‘s own Russianness was said to be a reasonable explanation of its 
dominating status in Estonian society. Not only propaganda constructed Russian 
cultural identity as legitimizing.  
 
Another measure of legitimizing identity construction was the language policy of the 
USSR. In Estonia the Estonian language was alive as the main means of the local 
people‘s communication, but the Russian language turned from the language of a small 
minority to an influential lingua franca. Soviet propaganda proclaimed that the ability 
to speak Russian was a form of profit for every individual. According to the agitation, 
children learning Russian ―want to understand the programmes of all-Union (central) 
television, they dream of travelling to Moscow and want to be able to converse with 
their contemporaries in Russian‖ (Mitter & Novikov 1985: 129). Those Estonians who 
could speak Russian fluently had an opportunity of better employment. In the Baltic 
region schools the education process lasted not 11 years, as in other regions of the 
Soviet Union, but 12 since the Soviet rulers wished young generations of Estonians also 
to speak Russian (Zetterberg 2007: 693). The situation demonstrated to the local people 
that the success in life could be achieved only if a person spoke fluent Russian. This 
language policy also resulted in the promotion of the Russian minority‘s self-esteem. 
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The status of Russian as a lingua franca shaped the formation of the Russian minority 
cultural identity. Russians began to feel that their language, an inalienable part of their 
culture, was a subject of pride. In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania there was almost no 
necessity for Russians to study the Baltic languages. According to Mitter and Novikov 
(1985: 130), ―only the Russians have the full range of educational and cultural facilities 
(including modern mass media) available in their mother tongue everywhere‖. Thus, the 
cultural identity of Russians was artificially made to be based on its members‘ 
admiration of the super-power and high, privileged status of the Russian language.  
 
In the Soviet period the identity of the Russian community was to a major extent formed 
by the activities of the Communist Party in Estonia. It encouraged migration to build up 
a significant Russian population in the land – a third of the whole population. From the 
first days of the Soviet presence the place was cleansed for the cultural identity of the 
new rulers – the old, pre-revolution Russian society in the country along with some 
cultural actors of independent Estonia faced repression. Then after a period of purges 
and agitation campaigns Russian cultural identity became legitimizing. 
 
I tend to feel that Russian cultural identity obtained the status of legitimizing through 
the measures of the Soviet government. Russians themselves appeared in the land 
through the Communist Party-organized workforce flow (Miljan 2004: 421). 
Frequently, the newcomers from internal regions of the USSR knew nothing about 
Estonia – only propaganda materials about the once bourgeois state, whose population 
chose the way of becoming the part of the Soviet Union.  Communist agitation about 
the character of pre-Soviet Estonia and its culture almost excluded the opportunity that 
many Russians arriving in the country would try to get acquainted with the 
achievements of the host culture. On the whole, Russians came to an almost entirely 
unknown environment, which perceived them as the occupiers. On the other hand, 
Russians themselves viewed their flow as a fraternal help to the oppressed small nation. 
Russians were taught to perceive their own culture as something ideal, always positive, 
without any disadvantages, whereas the negative sides of the culture of a sovereign 
republic were thoroughly exaggerated. Thus, Russian cultural identity looked at itself 
only positively. As a result of this there was set a ground for the future shock of the 
 30 
 
Russian community in Estonia, caused by their insufficient adaptation to Estonian 
reality. 
 
We can note that despite its alleged strength the cultural identity of the Russian minority 
in Estonia in fact was fairly weak; the main problem was that it to some extent 
depended on the support of the Soviet state. On the one hand, in many cases Russian 
culture and national traditions were persecuted or ignored in the USSR (Castells 1998: 
43). As Castells (ibid.) states, ―Russian nationalism was generally repressed as much as 
the cultural identity of the non-Russian subjected nations‖. On the other hand, the 
Soviet state promoted the policy of russification in the media, language and culture. In 
major institutions of the Soviet Union such as the army and the KGB the leaders were 
overwhelmingly Russian (ibid.). These measures gave the Russian identity a 
legitimizing status.  
 
The artificial character of it made evident that this cultural identity would not be able to 
face any significant challenges. Russians were taught not to think about the possible 
crises and problems related to non-Russian cultures of the Soviet Union - communist 
leaders proclaimed that Soviet society was a society without crises and a society of true 
freedom, while Soviet way of life was an atmosphere of true collectivism and 
comradeship, the strengthening friendship and monolithic nature of the country‘s 
nations and nationalities (Brezhnev 1977: 570). Any significant problems of the 
Estonian Russian community were solved by the super-force of the Soviet regime rather 
than by the efforts of Russians themselves. Thus, Russians frequently even did not 
know that there had been any resistance against their domination. The worldview of 
Russian cultural identity was protected from any criticism of its leading position in non-
Russian society. Consequently, I tend to think that the future problem of Estonian-
Russian relations in the 1990s was prepared by the policy of the Soviet Union: Russians 
were taught to view themselves and their culture as benefactors, and their language as 
lingua franca, so any possible changes of such situation were to cause Estonian 
Russians‘ concern. 
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The collapse of the USSR transformed the cultural identity of the Russian minorities in 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. As we have already seen, the main cornerstone of the 
Russian dominating position was the Soviet state. In my opinion, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was the collapse of the cultural identity of Soviet Russians because it to a 
major extent depended on the cultural policy of the USSR. In the 1990s Russians had to 
re-build their cultural identity and to study how to face challenges without the support 
of the mighty Soviet regime. They had to live in states which drastically returned to 
their pre-annexation cultural practices. Russians and their identity faced the necessity to 
transform in order to find a way in the new environment. The next chapter will focus on 
the re-establishment of Estonian independent culture, which caused the transformations 
of the cultural identity of the Estonian Russian community. 
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4 RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF ESTONIAN CULTURAL 
INDEPENDENCE AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION 
 
 
In this chapter the main focus will be on the measures taken by the Estonian 
government to restore the higher status of national culture after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. These measures to a major extent changed the identity of Russians living 
in the land. Before analyzing these changes I will demonstrate how the environment 
was transformed due to the new governmental policy on the protection of Estonian 
culture. We will not discuss the great entity of the whole post-Soviet culture of Estonia, 
but concentrate on some influential tendencies of the re-establishment of cultural 
independence. The transformations to a major extent began after the fall of the Soviet 
state, taking place in the 1990s. 
 
After the collapse of the USSR Estonia had the opportunity to develop its culture as the 
sovereign one. The government could concentrate on the restoration of the national 
music, literature, cinema, research into the country‘s history, and promotion of the 
Estonian language‘s status. As the leading newspaper Eesti Päeväleht summarized the 
goals of this promotion in 2008, ―What are the state interests of Estonia? To keep 
Estonianness [sic] and our culture‖ (Kollist 2008, translation mine). Nevertheless, the 
Estonian government had to face difficulties connected to this cultural revival. 
 
The serious problem of the revival was the significant number of Russian citizens living 
in Estonia who often expressed a desire not to be a part of the new Estonian society, to 
live separately, to maintain only their own culture and language. The sizable non-
Estonian community posed a certain threat to the small nation and culture whose 
representatives scarcely numbered a million (Talvet 2004: 129). Estonians had to begin 
their cultural identity revival under a constant existential threat to their culture and 
language, since in the country there was a large group of people which frequently did 
not express any wish to integrate into Estonian society or to learn the Estonian language 
(ibid.). In the 1990s the total population of Estonia was approximately 1 400 000 
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people: 71.8 per cent were Estonians, 21.6 per cent Russians, 2.1 per cent Ukrainians, 
1.3 per cent Byelorussians, 0.9 per cent Finns and 1.6 per cent others (Tulskiy 2001). 
This situation was particularly dangerous to the small nation of Estonia, as it could lead 
to a situation when foreign culture and language again would rise over Estonian ones 
and submit them as something secondary. Therefore, Estonian culture‘s dominating 
status was legally protected in order to guarantee its security.  
 
Other problems of post-Soviet Estonian culture were connected to the phenomena of 
previous decades – russification and censorship exerting strict control on national art. 
After the collapse of the USSR the Estonian government began solving these issues. 
Firstly, it tried to find a way to restore the higher status of Estonian identity after the 
period of the promotion of only Russianness, and to protect the national culture under 
the conditions of a significant non-Estonian group in the country. Secondly, the 
government planned to eliminate all the censoring bodies. In a free sovereign state 
Glavlit and other similar agencies were no more needed. The policy of the young 
Estonian state searched for a solution to the cultural problems set in the Soviet era. 
 
The easiest task was to liberate Estonian culture from the influence of the numerous 
censoring organizations of the USSR, since they did not outlive their master – the 
Soviet regime. These bodies could not exist without the strong support of the authorities 
who had provided them with the right to promote and punish. Glavlit, various pro-
Communist professional unions of composers, writers, and artists became history along 
with the collapse of the Soviet state. In the early 1990s the censorship of print 
publications and mass media was officially abolished in Estonia. The professional 
associations of cultural figures lost their Communist orientation and commonly became 
non-political. The era of ideological control was past, and national cultural figures 
received their long-awaited freedom of creation, thus being able to touch once forbidden 
topics of their own Estonian cultural practices, the fight for their independence, and 
conflicts caused by controversy between Estonian and the Soviet culture. The same 
process of liberation took place not only in the sphere of art, but also in the media. 
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union the communist newspapers were either abolished 
or privatized, and new national papers appeared instead of them. For instance, the 
Soviet-era leading paper Rahva Hääl [People‘s Voice] was privatized in 1993 and 
gradually turned into the non-political Estonian daily Eesti Päeväleht [Estonian Daily 
Paper] (Hoyer 1993: 269). In the period of the early 1990s there appeared 47 new 
national newspapers and 44 magazines (ibid. 263).Thus, the mass media turned into a 
means of national unification. The topics of the uniqueness of Estonian culture, pride in 
being the Estonian, glorification of national and cultural sovereignty were raised. The 
freedom of art and speech in Estonia was achieved. Unfortunately, the process of a 
return to pre-Soviet Estonian culture was not so smooth, although Estonians, despite all 
difficulties, finally managed to revive the latter. The main problem and obstacle of the 
revival was the decades-long USSR-maintained policy of russification of the country 
and culture. 
 
The most important aim of independent Estonia was to destroy the chains on its own 
culture which were forged by the measures of Sovietisation and russification taken by 
the Soviet regime. In the 1990s Estonians felt more sympathy towards the West and 
considered their culture to be an unalienable part of European culture. As the national 
newspaper Postimees wrote in 2003, ―It is possible to remain Estonians only in the case 
of being Europeans. We [Estonians] should join European culture. We are a part of 
European culture‖ (Luik, Nyganen, Engelbrecht, Surva & Kiviräkh 2003).  
 
In the 1990s the government took a number of measures to eliminate the stereotype that 
Estonian culture has always been a subject of the country‘s masters – either Germans, 
Swedes or Russians. In national universities departments of Estonian history, art, 
archeology were re-created, and researchers set out to prove that the invaders and 
conquerors did not create Estonia‘s culture: it successfully existed before the beginning 
of crusaders‘ or Communists‘ rule. Scientists took the course of demonstrating how 
unique was the culture which was mistakenly perceived as the dependent copy of other 
cultures. Russians were portrayed as bad rulers harming Estonian culture, while the time 
of Germans‘ or Swedes‘ rule was presented as ―peaceful and prosperous‖ or ―the Good 
Old Swedish Era‖ (Miljan 2004: 65–66). In fact, the influence of Swedish and German 
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culture contributed much to the development of Estonian culture: Swedes and Germans 
printed the first books in Estonian, encouraged reading, and promoted literacy (ibid.). 
On the other hand, they treated Estonians as their serfs and used cruel methods to 
baptize them. Estonian rebellions were not a rare event during the period of Swedish 
and German rule (Samarina 2009). At the same time Russian rule was milder because 
nobody forced Estonians to be baptized as Orthodox Christians, and their culture had an 
opportunity to develop (ibid.). Thus, the one-sided image of Russian imperial period as 
the time of Estonians‘ oppressions is not correct. 
 
The focus of Estonian education was also on pre-Soviet culture, on its achievements and 
peculiarities. The short-term period of independence was hailed as a flourishing era. 
Conversely the period of the Soviet domination over Estonia was described according to 
the new textbooks as ―just as bad as Nazism‖ (Laar 2008). Nevertheless, this 
interpretation is not correct since the Soviet Union made much for the development of 
Estonia. Non-Russian union republics received more resources than the RSFSR, their 
leaders were the local people, and the population had more rights than average Russians 
(Castells 2004: 43). At the same time the period of sovereignty was not ideal and had its 
own problems of a weak Estonian economy, civil rights violations, and less 
opportunities of education for the population (Samarina 2009). 
 
On the whole, the education programs in schools and universities were transformed to 
demonstrate to Estonian students that their culture created significant masterpieces not 
only during the period of foreign domination over it, but also in the period of 
independence. The Estonian Education Law of 1992 proclaimed the necessity of ―the 
preservation of the Estonian people, culture, and nation [sic]‖ (Vetik 1999: 93). Another 
measure of cultural policy of new Estonia was the Estonian language protective 
measures, since the Soviet era of Russian as a lingua franca challenged its status. 
 
In the USSR-controlled Estonia there was no attempt to eliminate its language, but its 
position was weakened by the fact that one could live in the country using Russian as a 
main means of communication. According to the Population Census of 1989, only 18 
per cent of non-Estonians claimed that they commanded the Estonian language (Vetik 
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1999: 71). At the same time ―it would be realistic to estimate that about 3/4 of Estonians 
commanded Russian fairly well at the end of [the] Soviet period‖ (ibid., Vetik‘s 
translation). After the collapse of the USSR the status of Estonia was legally protected.  
 
The period of the 1990s was a time of legislative action aimed at the promotion of 
Estonian language status. In 1992 the citizenship law was accepted; it gave the rights of 
citizens only to those who were citizens before the Soviet presence, and to their 
descendants. Those who wish to apply for citizenship should not only live in Estonia for 
two years, but also pass an exam of language proficiency in Estonian. The Constitution 
of the Republic of Estonia in 1992 defined Estonian as the state language. In Vetik‘s 
words, ―it guarantees citizens the right to Estonian-language education, individuals‘ 
rights to conduct affairs and communicate with local governments in Estonian, and 
prescribes conducting affairs of government in Estonian‖ (Vetik 1999: 99).  
 
In 1993 The Elementary and Upper Secondary Schools Law stated that Estonian was the 
main language of instruction in the country‘s schools, while elementary schools with 
alternative languages of instruction had to maintain studying Estonian as a subject. In 
1995 The Law on Language of the Estonian Republic was adopted in order to proclaim 
the leading position of the national language of Estonia. According to it, all languages 
besides Estonian were defined as foreign (Vetik 1999: 72).  Using other languages in 
oral communication in public institutions could be accepted only with the agreement of 
the public authorities and if the authorities commanded other languages. The state also 
set a strategy of learning the Estonian language in non-Estonian groups. 
 
In 1998 the Estonian parliament accepted The Language Learning Strategy for the Non-
Estonian Population. According to Vetik (1999: 72), ―the strategy stipulates that the 
language policy should guarantee the status of Estonian as the official language‖. The 
strategy planning for the period 1998-2012 was to guarantee the possibility to study 
Estonian for all Estonian inhabitants through a variety of educational programs. Thus, it 
was aimed at guaranteeing the status and development of the Estonian language, at 
solving the problems set by the Soviet policy of russification. Estonian became the main 
means of communication, strengthened by the governmental acts in maintaining its 
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dominating status and trying to popularize it within the non-Estonian groups. Learning 
the Estonian language meant also learning Estonian culture – thus, the strategy 
contributed to the reinforcement of the national culture through making it accessible to 
others non-Estonian part of the country‘s inhabitants. This learning was planned to lead 
to easier socio-cultural adaptation of non-Estonians to the conditions of the state. For 
the promotion of Estonian culture and language new educational programs were set up – 
the focus was on the younger generation of non-Estonians. 
 
In the spring of 1998 two educational strategy documents – ―A Learning Estonia‖ and 
―Educational Strategy in Estonia‖ were completed in order to develop the process of 
non-Estonians‘ studying national language in primary schools (Vetik 1999: 92). These 
documents created a new national curriculum which developed new textbooks, new 
programs of teacher development, new technological aids etc. More and more classes 
had to take place partly or wholly in the Estonian language. According to the 
development program, by the year 2003 two technical subjects and two other subjects 
had to be taught in the Estonian language in schools based on other languages (ibid. 93).  
 
The aim of these measures was to make non-Estonian students finishing schools speak 
the national language fluently: ―this would mean he or she would be able to gain 
Estonian citizenship without supplementary language exam, and also the elimination of 
linguistic and cultural barriers‖ (Vetik 1999: 92). These measures were planned to 
contribute to the process of the integration of non-Estonian groups into Estonian 
society. The Estonian government assumed that a person learning the Estonian language 
from primary school was more likely to successfully integrate into the new reality 
constructed by the policy aimed at the return to higher status of Estonian culture. 
 
On the whole, during the period of the 1990s the Estonian government took major 
measures to free place for the development of Estonian culture, to secure it as a 
dominant, to guarantee its leading position. The political course of the whole state was 
concentrated on the re-establishment of higher status of Estonian culture and its 
protection. The government tried to unite Estonians on their common identity, to 
maintain its high position, and to guard the Estonian language. The aim of the system of 
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education was officially proclaimed to be preservation of Estonian culture. Laws made 
the Estonian language the main and primary language of civil service. The whole 
concept of citizenship now was based on a person‘s allegiance to pre-Soviet Estonian 
community – Estonians were encouraged to be the country‘s citizens. As for the 
applicants of the non-Estonian background of a citizenship, their acceptance was based 
on their ability to learn the Estonian language. The revival of Estonian culture was 
closely connected to the integration of non-Estonian minorities into the society. For 
performing this aim numerous programs of the promotion of the Estonian language 
within non-Estonian groups were set up. 
 
Due to the state-accepted programs and projects, non-Estonian groups in the society 
were offered an opportunity to at least partially integrate into the entity of the Estonian 
cultural community through the process of learning the Estonian language and culture. 
This integration began from the schools and universities – when a non-Estonian 
individual received their first knowledge of Estonia. Then, it continued into adult life – 
applying for citizenship demanded proficiency in the Estonian language; participation in 
the country‘s political life was impossible without knowing its language; the language 
fluency Estonian was a strong guarantee of better employment for non-Estonians. At the 
same time these measures were planned to provide stronger social unity and tolerance in 
Estonian society. 
 
Nevertheless, the Council of Europe has condemned the negative impact of 
Estonianisation on the Estonian Russian minority (Surskaya 2010). In 2010 it criticized 
many measures of Estonianisation and demanded that the Estonian government should 
change its legislation in order to guarantee the rights of minorities, especially Russians 
(ibid.). The experts of the Council of Europe noted that the interests of Russians have to 
be taken into consideration while planning any information or educational reforms; the 
minority identity should be respected by the state. According to the Council of Europe, 
the new principle of citizenship has almost excluded Russians from the political life of 
the country (Perechen osnovnyh pretenzij i rekomendatsij mezhdunarodnyh organizatsij 
i NPO k Estonii po pravam natsionalnyh menshinstv 2010). Russians cannot vote or be 
elected; they cannot influence the life of their state and are not represented sufficiently 
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in the country‘s business and elite (ibid.). Russians‘ socio-economic conditions of living 
are worse in comparison with those of Estonians, and Russians face far more problems 
of employment than Estonians (ibid.).  The Council of Europe stated that the cultural 
specificity of Russians should be recognised; the right of Russian schools in Estonia to 
use Russian as the main language of instruction should not be challenged. On the whole, 
it demanded that the measures of the promotion of the Estonian language should be 
supplemented with guarantees of the minorities‘ right to study in their national language 
(ibid.). The policy of integrating was criticized for concentration on teaching Estonian 
only, while according to the experts the language policy did not give Russians the media 
in their mother tongue and did not protect their language (ibid.). Moreover, the 
integration was said to be slow; the Council of Europe called on the Estonian 
government to integrate Estonians and Russians into the one society to avoid interethnic 
tensions.  
 
The Estonian government has frequently promised the Council of Europe that it will 
take the measures to solve the problem of the Russian minority, but in fact the situation 
remains negative (Zaytseva 2009). The government does not want to ease the process of 
the citizenship application or give Russian the status of second official language (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, the European criticism has had some impact on Estonians, and the 
Estonian authorities have taken some measures to help Russians (ibid.). In 2000s the 
government was trying to hire more civil servants who can speak Russian fluently. 
Thus, those Russians who do not speak Estonian will receive an opportunity to 
communicate with officials in Russian. Some TV-programs in Estonian got Russian 
subtitles (ibid.). However, despite all these measures the situation of the minority 
remains acute. Estonian Russians have to adapt to the new conditions. 
 
The new situation created by the Estonian cultural revival has established the dilemma 
of Estonian Russians. They still have to choose whether they should adapt to the 
transforming conditions of cultural policy or not. Russians have different views on their 
cultural identity life in post-Soviet Estonia. As Kaja Tampere (2005: 172) notes, the 
crucial issue is whether the Russian minority, ―a Big Brother‖ in the recent past, will 
develop an identity of its own, embedded in the given territorial-historical environment 
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which they share with the majority, or whether this minority will still represent, not only 
for others, Russia and its interests. Some Russians have constructed their identity on the 
principles of resistance. 
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5 TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MINORITY IN TERMS OF 
RESISTANCE IDENTITY 
 
 
This chapter will focus on the transformations of Estonian Russian cultural identity after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fall of the USSR in 1991 resulted in the loss of 
what Castells calls a legitimizing identity among Estonian Russians. It was replaced by 
either resistance or project identity. In this chapter the focus is on the former one. 
 
According to Manuel Castells (1997: 8), resistance identity is the one embraced by 
those who are in a devalued sociopolitical position and feel stigmatized by the logic of 
domination. In Castells‘ (ibid.) words, these people build trenches of resistance and 
survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to those of the dominant 
group. Resistance identity is thus aimed at guaranteeing survival in a non-friendly 
environment. To a large extent, some proportion of the Estonian Russian minority 
appears to have acquired precisely this kind of cultural identity in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 
In the 1990s Estonian Russians were not ready for the new Estonian cultural policy, 
perceived it as a threat and resisted it. The measures promoting higher status of Estonian 
culture were viewed by some Russians as a form of purposeful, intended aggression 
towards their culture. Therefore, the Estonian cultural revival has led to the anxiety of 
some proportion of Russian minority. This anxiety is caused by the conditions under 
which many Russians have difficulties in everyday life due to their culture and language 
(or due to absence of knowledge of the Estonian ones because of the policy of the 
Soviet Union). As a result of the cultural policy transformations in the 1990s, the 
minority began to face the problems. One of the main difficulties remains the language 
problem. 
 
In the 2000s the transformation of language policy and reduction of the Russian 
language to the language of the minority has had an impact on the issue of Estonian 
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Russians‘ employment and political activities. So, when Estonian has become the only 
official language, proficiency in it is demanded everywhere, and inability to speak it 
inevitably closes the road to a better career. Kaja Tampere‘s (2005: 160-162) interviews 
with the Russian workers of Narva Power Plant vividly demonstrate that the new 
conditions are hard for many Russians living in Estonia – due to the language problem 
they have to ―do the jobs no Estonian would want to do‖ as the opportunity of better 
white-collar job requires fluency in Estonian; Russians with no skill in Estonian have 
―nowhere to go‖, cannot ―get work anywhere else but here in Narva‖. Another problem 
of the Russian minority in the 2000s is the ―numbness‖ of Russians due to the 
transformations of the language policy. The new citizenship law provides with the rights 
of a citizen only those Russians who are able to pass the proficiency exam in Estonian.  
 
In addition to the problems of language transformation the Russian minority faces the 
problem of the cultural redirecting of Estonia and the subsequent radical revaluation of 
the Russian role in Estonian history. The image of Russian has in many aspects turned 
from being that of a benefactor to an occupier. As the Estonian Russian daily Den za 
Dnem’ writes, ―for many years Russians have been hearing that they are occupiers in 
Estonia‖ (Rusakov 2009). The Soviet era has been criticized, and the sovereignty period 
is promoted. At the same time many Estonian Russians do not accept this new view. As 
Kaja Tampere‘s (2005: 160) interviews of Russian workers demonstrate, in the 1990s 
the following opinion prevailed: ―we were brought here [to Estonia] to build up the 
energy industry, produce light for the entire Estonian population, and now we seem to 
be thrown into the dustbin‖. The review of the Russian role along with the language 
problems and problems of adaptation have led to anxiety in the Russian minority. 
 
There is no doubt that for Russians the adaptation to the new situation has not been 
easy. ―It would be too much to ask that [sic] historical influences to be erased from 
people‘s memories immediately‖ (Tampere 2005: 156). The serious concern of the 
Russian minority is the fear of full merging with Estonian culture and resulting gradual 
loss of Russianness. This fear has led to the emergence of various Russian associations 
preserving their culture and sense of self. 
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Russian cultural identity in Estonia is marked by a process of internal associating and 
building a small internal world of the community. This uniting is primarily based on a 
person‘s Russianness, one‘s pro-Russian (in many cases pro-Soviet) attitude to the new 
Estonian environment, adherence to the values of Russian culture, and a desire to 
maintain the Russian language‘s high status as a major means of communication. When 
Russians have lost their identity dominating positions, the transforming conditions of 
being are a catalyst of the centripetal tendencies of creating some form of their own 
small world based on the feeling of belonging to Russia. Many Russians express their 
desire to remain Russians and not to be integrated. At the same time they concentrate 
only on the positive side of Russia‘s influence and condemn the Estonian reevaluation 
of the history. Those Russians who have chosen the path of resistance wish their world 
to be closed from the external influence of Estonian life. If one paraphrases Manuel 
Castells, this situation is close to ―the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded‖ 
(Castells 1998: 9, original italics). This uniting and own world-building is closely 
connected to the process of establishing political organizations which are aimed at the 
defense of Russian cultural identity and its status promotion. 
 
Uniting some Russians over the issue of the protection of the Russian minority interests 
under the conditions of the new reality has been encountered by the process of 
establishing pro-Russian political organizations. These organizations are intended to 
guarantee the safety and security of Russian cultural identity. In 1993 the 
Representative Assembly of the Russian-Speaking Population was established. In 
Vetik‘s words (1999: 45), ―its stated aim was to represent the interests of this section of 
the population, whose views would otherwise not be heard in Estonia‘s state 
institutions‖. Interestingly, this assembly included not only Russians, but also a major 
number of other nationalities of the former Soviet Union. As the members of the 
organization said: ―the Russian speaking population - these are the Ukrainians, and 
Belarusans, and Jews, and Tatars. All we Russian speakers have been put under the 
same socio-political circumstances‖ (Laitin 1998: 278).  It was considered important for 
this organization to take a constructive approach, to observe the legal principles of 
Estonian Republic and to defend Russian-speaking people‘s interests only by 
constitutional means (Vetik 1999: 45).  
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In 1993 Russkaya Obschina Estonii [the Russian Community of Estonia] was 
established. Its aim was ―the preservation and development of Russian culture and 
spirituality‖ (Russkaya Obschina Estonii 2009). This community intended to represent 
and protect the interests of its members in state, public, cultural and commercial 
organizations, to promote acquaintance with their cultural heritage, to establish legal 
educational bodies, to accept and help the Russian Orthodox Church in the sphere of 
maintaining the spiritual culture of Russians and to provide them with legal advice 
(ibid.). In the 1990s the Russian minority did not only want to preserve its culture, but 
also wished to actively participate in Estonian political life. 
 
In 1993 Russkaya Partiya Estonii [the Russian party of Estonia] was organized. It 
proclaimed itself as ―the conservative party of the Russian minority in Estonia‖ and the 
―political national-democratic body of the Russian population of Estonia‖ (Russkaya 
Partiya Estonii 2009). In 1995 the party was represented in the Estonian national 
parliament Riigikogu (six out of 101 seats), and in 1996 it created the Russian faction in 
Tallinn City Council. The Russian party stated in the program that it was responsible for 
the fate of Estonian Russians and it had to protect their interests. According to the 
program statement, ―Russians have lived in Estonia since the dawn of time. The Russian 
minority is an inalienable part of the history and culture of the Estonian state‖, and the 
priority aim was ―the securing of our [Russian] traditions, history, culture, language, 
ethic and spiritual values‖ (ibid.).  
 
In December 1995 the First Congress of Russian Citizens of Estonia met in Tallinn with 
190 delegates (Laitin 1998: 278). It deputy chairman Petr Rozhok stated that ―the goal 
of the newly formed Estonian Republic Association of Russian Citizens was to indicate 
to Russian-speakers in Estonia which candidates they should vote‖ (ibid.). On October 
17, 1993 Estonian Russians and Russian speakers took an active part in the local 
elections in Estonia. In Tallinn City Council, Russian electoral blocs won 27 out of 64 
seats (Vetik 1999: 46). The aim was simple – the Russian deputies in Estonian councils 
could represent the interests of the Russian minority, be the voice of their electors‘ 
common Russianness. As one leader of the Estonian Russian groups Yuri Zhuravlev put 
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it, the aim of the Estonian Russian political forces was a situation when Russians voted 
for Russians (Yuri Zhuravlev 2009). 
 
In actual fact, there are far more various Russian associations than this study has listed. 
However, even a small list describing these groups demonstrates that to a major extent 
they are build up on the foundation of resistance identity. A significant number of the 
organizations use in their rhetoric such words and expressions as ―we will be unheard if 
we are not united‖, ―united we should represent our [Russian] interests‖, ―our 
Russianness should be protected‖ (Vetik 1999: 45-46). Yuri Zhuravlev, the Estonian 
Russian leader mentioned, uses even more aggressive words: ―We should protect the 
interests of [Estonian] Russian people, the people whose children‘s right to study in the 
mother tongue has been stolen‖ (Yuri Zhuravlev 2009). Thus, the organizations view 
the current environment of Estonian Russians‘ cultural identity as something 
threatening, dangerous or at least unfriendly. The programs of these associations 
emphasize the necessity of the preservation of Russianness by all possible means. 
  
On the other hand, resistance identity commonly includes not only cultural preservation, 
but also resistance, challenge to the dominant identity. In this case, in the 2000s Russian 
political organizations typically avoid the rhetoric of any challenge to the dominating 
Estonian culture (for fear of being dissolved), but the practical activities of some 
associations are aimed at the struggle for a more significant extent of Russian control 
over Estonian political and cultural life. More Russians in the country‘s councils can 
mean not only better representation of Russian minority interests but also louder voices 
demanding pro-Russian rather than pro-Estonian evaluation of Russian culture role in 
Estonian history, past Soviet successes, and the results of the decades-long Russian 
domination over the land. Another measure of Russian cultural identity protection and 
resistance to the dominating Estonian cultural identity is a tightening of the ties between 
Estonian Russians and Russians in the Russian Federation. 
 
The actions (taken both by some Russians in Estonia and the Russian government) of 
uniting Russians and Estonian Russians, and securing Russian cultural identity of the 
latter are to some extent associated with the activities of Mezhdunarodnyi sovet 
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rossiyskih sootechestvennikov [International Council of Russian compatriots] and its 
Estonian branch – Soyuz organizatziy rossiyskih sootechestvennikov Estonii 
[Association of Russian compatriots‘ organizations in Estonia]. This International 
Council proclaims its main goal as ―the promotion of uniting and coordinating the 
activities of compatriots‘ public organizations in the name of securing ethnic identity 
and the national uniqueness [of Russians]‖ (Mezhdunarodnyi sovet rossiyskih 
sootechestvennikov 2010). For its achievement the Council declares the necessary 
actions as consolidation with Russian diasporas abroad, promotion of the creation of a 
united Russian cultural, informational and educational space in order to strengthen the 
solidarity of Russian diasporas, and their international position, and the development of 
the conditions necessary for increasing cultural, intellectual, and business links between 
the abroad Russians and Russia itself. The work of the Council is supplemented by its 
local branch in Estonia. 
 
The Estonian branch of the Association of Russian compatriots continues the policy of 
the central body towards the Russian minority in Estonia. This association describes the 
basic directions of its activities as the support, assistance and promotion of Russian 
compatriots and their organization under the standards of international law, international 
treaties between Estonia and Russia, and Estonian legislation in the sphere of human 
rights and liberties; securing and developing Russian uniqueness, culture, language, 
education and system of information in Russian; the creation of the favorable conditions 
for the implementation of the programs for promoting the compatriots; organizing a 
system of equal, many-sided mutually beneficial relations with Russia; cultural and 
educational measures as well as a child and youth policy.  
 
Through the organizations of compatriots Russia exercises some influence on the 
minority in Estonia. To a major extent this influence has led to an increase in Estonian 
Russians‘ resistance identity tendencies. One of the most vivid forms of Russian 
identity activities for fighting Estonianisation has been the establishment of a separate 
Russian world within Estonian society. This world includes a specific Estonian Russian 
information system, theatre, various cultural associations etc. To some extent, the 
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community world resembles the Russian quasi-state located in Estonia. Undoubtedly, 
this phenomenon deserves to be described.  
 
The Estonian Russian information system includes TV and radio channels, newspapers 
and Internet-portals. Many Estonian Russians mainly watch the so-called Perviy 
Baltiyskiy kanal [First Baltic channel] which is the Baltic-oriented branch of ORT 
[Obschestvennoe Rossiyskoe Televidenie, Public Russian Television]. It usually 
broadcasts the news and music of the Russian Federation in Russian. The minority in 
Estonia has several Russian-language radio channels such as Raadio 4 [Radio 4], 
Semeinoe Radio [Family Radio], Narodnoe Radio [People‘s Radio] and some others. 
The representatives of the Estonian Russian community own and publish their Russian 
newspapers which include Den’ za Dnem [Day by Day], Molodoj Estonii [Estonian 
Youth], Narva, Narvskaja Gazeta [Narva Paper], Nasha Gazeta [Our paper] etc. 
Estonian Russians have also created their information system in the Internet: Russkiy 
Portal [Russian Portal, www.veneportaal.ee], providing the Russian minority with 
information and analytic materials, and Portal Russkoi Obschiny Estonii [Portal of 
Russian community of Estonia, www.baltija.eu], promoting unity and equality of 
Russians in Estonia.  
 
The characteristic of the above-mentioned Russian information system is that it to some 
extent reflects the Estonian, Russian and world events from the position of Russia, or at 
least from the position of the Russia-influenced minority in the state. The surrounding 
reality is frequently seen by Estonian Russians‘ newspapers through the lens of their 
specific community, and this lens is not always the same as the Estonian media. Special 
attention is paid by this information system to the everyday life of the Russian minority, 
its relations with the Estonian authorities, the impact of Estonianisation on its existence, 
cultural events of Estonian Russians and their history. Many newspapers try to advocate 
the presence of Russians in the state, use the rhetoric of the thousand-years long mutual 
coexistence of Estonians and Russians, and pay attention to the positive consequences 
of Soviet domination over the Baltic region. Thus, some Estonian Russians live in the 
world of their own news, and perceive reality from the position of their information 
system. However, such Russians‘ cultural space consists not only of their own 
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newspapers and radio channels. Its most important elements are Russian cultural 
activities (plays, operas, books publishing, exhibitions, and concerts). 
 
The resistant tendency of some Estonian Russians‘ cultural identity is not only related to 
the desire of self-isolation from Estonianisation, but also to the aspiration to continue 
developing their particular culture even in the territory of a foreign state. Due to this 
development, it is possible for some Estonian Russians to interact only with Russian 
culture and avoid contact with Estonian cultural activities. Russkiy Teatr Estonii [the 
Russian Theater of Estonia] exists in Tallinn. It is the only professional Russian theater 
in Estonia (Russkiy Teatr Estonii 2009). This theater provides audiences with Russian 
classics. It views its aim as the preservation and continuation of the Russian theatre 
traditions. Besides the theater Russian cultural centers are also presented by the 
association of Estonian Russian writers. 
 
The literary activities of Estonian Russians are promoted by Objedinenie Russkih 
literatorov Estonii [Association of Russian writers of Estonia], publishing office 
Russkiy Telegraf [Russian Telegraph], and the Estonian branch of Soyuz pisatelei Rossii 
[Association of Russian writers]. The Association of Russian writers of Estonia unites 
Estonian Russian novelists, poets, critics and literature researchers. Its aim is to promote 
young Russian poets and writers, to translate Estonian literature into Russian and 
conversely, to create new textbooks for Russian school in Estonia, and to develop 
relations with Russia (Objedinenie Russkih literatorov Estonii 2009). As one member of 
the association Ivan Gavrilovitsch proclaims, ―Russia can live without us, but we cannot 
live without Russia‖ (Vladimir Illyachevitsch 2000). The publishing office Russkiy 
Telegraf maintains close cooperation with this association, publishes the work of its 
members and disseminates them in Estonia (Russkiy Telegraf 2007). The Estonian 
branch of Soyuz pisatelei Rossii aims to develop connections with Russian literature, to 
support the publication of modern Russian and Estonian Russian writers and poems, and 
to promote Estonian Russian literature in the region (Vladimir Illyachevitsch 2000).  
 
Various literature associations are connected to the central Moscow association Soyuz 
pisatelei Rossii in the same way as it was in the Soviet period. The resistant tendency of 
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Russian cultural identity is demonstrated by the fact that Estonian Russian associations 
have actively advocated the necessity of keeping strong ties with the Russian Federation 
instead of integrating into Estonian society. These publishing activities allow Estonian 
Russians to speak proudly of their own and Russian Federation literature as if it 
contrasts with the literature of independent Estonia. The aim is to restore the status of 
Russian books and keep minority Russianness secure. According to Vladimir 
Illyachevitsch, one of the leader of Estonian Russian literature association: ―Only by 
choosing the path of self-restoration can we secure the future for Russian culture and 
literature in the Baltic region‖ (Vladimir Illyachevitsch 2000).  
 
The sphere of music is also represented in the Russian minority cultural space. Estonian 
Russian music has continued to develop, and the artists maintain close relations with 
Russia. The activities of Estonian Russian musical groups, choirs and bands are 
associated with Soyuz russkih prosvetitelskih i blagotvoritelnyh obschestv v Estonii 
[Association of Russian educational and charity organizations of Estonia] which 
organizes Russian concerts and festivals (Soyuz russkih prosvetitelskih I 
blagotvoritelnyh obschestv v Estonii 2003). Most attention is paid to Russian music. 
The association organizes concerts in almost all towns with significant Russian 
communities, and maintains close cooperation with Russia (ibid.).  
 
Another part of the security system of Russianness is Estonian Russians‘ sphere of 
education. According to the Estonian Russian teachers, 63 Russian schools exist in 
contemporary Estonia, and the parents‘ demand for Russian education for their children 
still remains high (Eliseeva 2009). The education programs also differ from the major 
Estonian schools. For instance, the re-evaluation of the history of Estonia under the 
Soviet rule in new Estonian textbooks is often criticized by some Estonian Russian 
teachers, since a significant proportion of them graduated from the Soviet pedagogical 
universities and do not wish to pay attention to the problems of the Soviet period. In 
some cases official textbooks are not used, but preference is given to the textbooks of 
the Russian Federation or the textbooks composed by Estonian Russian themselves. 
According to some Estonians, it is due to the schools that Russians‘ problems of living 
in Estonia appear. Since the system of Estonian Russian education often applies an 
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entirely different approach of viewing the country‘s history than the official schools, the 
students receive an interpretation of events which can create problems in their future 
adult life in Estonia (Burlakov 2008).  
 
Commonly the main problems of the interpretation of Estonian history are related to 
such events as the beginning of the Soviet presence in 1940 and the Great Patriotic war. 
These controversial issues have radically different approaches and attitudes. On the one 
hand, official Soviet history portrayed the Soviet presence as the ―fraternal‖ help to the 
oppressed nation (Estonskaya Sovetskaya Sozialisticheskaya Respublika 2009). The 
Great Patriotic war was viewed as a holy war of all the republics of the Soviet Union. 
The members of the Estonian resistance movement (―forest brothers‖) were either 
ignored in the official textbooks or portrayed as ―Hitlerites‘ servants‖ and ―Nazi 
collaborators‖ (ibid.). This Soviet image has been accepted by Russians and remains 
dominant (Laar 2009).  
 
On the other hand, Estonian history views the Soviet presence as occupation, the war as 
the change of the oppressors from Communists to Nazis and back, and Estonian 
resistance as a source of ―national pride for the Estonians‖ (Parming 1992: xiii-xv). This 
interpretation emphasizes that Soviet rule was imposed on Estonia and Estonians had 
reasons to resist, but at the same time it ignores the following fact: according to Castells 
(2004: 43), leaders of the Soviet Union funded the development of the union republics 
very well. The occupying powers do not commonly invest significant funds in the 
development of the occupied territory. The Estonian Russian education system 
generally promotes the Soviet image of history, which is totally different from the one 
of the Estonian official history, and this controversy causes the problems (Burlakov 
2008).  
 
This education system portrays the idea of its integration into the Estonian education 
system in negative terms. Thus, we can conclude that it to some extent promotes 
resistance tendencies of the minority cultural identity. The main concern of Russian 
teachers is the fear that, due to Estonianisation, their schools will disappear, and the 
only means to avoid it is to resist and keep Russianness safe (Eliseeva 2009). Many 
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Estonian Russian teachers perceive themselves as in the front line of preserving Russian 
history, culture and language in Estonia.  
 
Their resistance to Estonianisation, of course, remains within the frame of legality – 
teachers and students loudly speak about their need to study in Russian, write to the 
media in favor of the Russian schools, and take part in discussion with Estonian 
officials. The Russian minority resistance identity is to a large extent manifested 
through the media. Moreover, its role in identity construction is significant. As Berhard 
Giesen (1996: 11–12) writes, the media both guarantee national cultural identity and at 
the same time construct it. In this research the focus is put not on a nation, but on a 
minority. However, the study suggests that the media influenced the Russian minority in 
Estonia in the same way: guaranteed its cultural identity and constructed it. Therefore, it 
is vital to focus on the Estonian, Russian and Estonian Russian mass media to 
understand this influence.  
 
Although it cannot be said that the Estonian media constructed the resistance identity of 
Estonian Russians in a direct way, it influenced some Russians, directing them towards 
resistance. In the 1990s-2000s some proportion of the media defined many Russians 
rather negatively as aliens and occupiers (Tampere 2005: 169). It drew a clear line 
between Estonian and Russian cultural identity as divided by the alien character of 
Russians in Estonia. Thus, in some cases the media excluded Estonian Russians from 
the social life of the country and did not recognize them as equal citizens. This 
exclusion may have made some Estonian Russians feel themselves to be in a position 
stigmatized by the dominant social group, Estonians. As a result of this feeling they 
behaved according to Manuel Castells‘ theory of resistance identity, and generated the 
latter to oppose their exclusion. In fact, the exclusionist view on Russians in Estonia 
was not shared by the all the media, and the Estonians themselves. But many Russians 
had an impression that they were totally rejected by the whole nation. The following 
article will be discussed as an example of this view. 
 
The Estonian journalist Tiit Made‘s recent article (2010) openly proclaims that a 
significant number of Russians in Estonia are ―the fifth column of Russia‖ (Made 
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2010). In Made‘s words, they are the tools of Moscow, its brute force. Moreover, he 
feels that the Bronze Night (the Estonian Russian riots caused by the relocation of the 
war monument in 2007) was ―the failed effort of riot provoked by Russia‖ (ibid.). In his 
opinion those Russians who express sympathies towards the Russian Federation are ―the 
occupiers‖ (ibid.). He tends to think that the presence of pro-Russian forces in Estonia is 
a threat to the integrity and sovereignty of the Estonian republic (ibid.).  
 
Thus, the recent article demonstrates the widespread exclusionist view on Estonian 
Russians who are portrayed as something dangerous to Estonia. At the same time the 
view mentioned in this particular case is to some extent provoked by the shock of many 
Estonians caused by the Bronze Night (which will be discussed in the next chapter). The 
Russian riots scared many Estonians, and it is not surprising that some proportion of the 
media, especially the conservative newspapers, still present rather radical measures to 
prevent such events in the future. Nevertheless, in the 2000s due to such articles many 
Russians have begun to feel that if they are not accepted by the Estonian state, they 
should be orientated towards Russia, which will be able to defend them. The clear 
distinction between the dominant nation and the Soviet-period immigrants in the media 
has made Russians tighten their mutual relations and unite around their common 
Russianness. In the 2000s a proportion of the media has created an image of an 
unfriendly environment in mind of some Estonian Russians, and they have begun to 
establish their cultural identity on the basis of antagonism towards Estonians and their 
culture. 
 
Not all the newspapers of Estonia present such a one-sided view of Estonian Russians. 
It can be said that in many cases some proportion of the Estonian media tries to solve 
the problem of tensions between many Estonians and Estonian Russians, but there are 
the situations when even the peaceful articles can direct the latter towards resistance 
identity due to the difficulty of different values and views on the history. Commonly 
these differences are related to the perception of the Soviet presence. For example, the 
article by the Estonian political leader Mart Laar (2009) in Postimees demonstrates a 
more positive view of Estonian Russians, encourages the dialogue, but at the same time 
touches the topic of the Soviet presence and unintentionally offences the minority, thus 
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promoting its resistant tendency. The author of the article proposes that both Estonians 
and Russians in Estonia can better their mutual relations through communication, but 
then he makes the serious mistake. He notes that many Russians perceive Soviet history 
as their own, and any criticism of it is perceived as offence to them (Laar 2009). At the 
same time he speaks of the Soviet presence as an occupation and annexation, thus, 
according to his own logic, offending Estonian Russians.  
 
The consequences of these unintentional offences can be simple: many Estonian 
Russians, especially older generation, perceive Soviet history as something ideal and 
holy, and even the one word ―occupation‖ can immediately destroy any perspective of a 
successful dialogue between Estonians and Estonian Russians. The latter do not want to 
recognize themselves to be occupiers; if the dominant group of the society imposes a 
stereotypical negative view on Soviet past on them, they will resist and construct an 
identity based on the principles of antagonism between them and Estonians. It should be 
understood by the Estonian media that many Russians do not like harsh criticism of the 
Soviet era, and such a topic can be avoided altogether for a better dialogue. Their 
identity is to a significant extent based on the sense of pride in the Soviet Union, and if 
one challenges the USSR, it means that their identity is challenged too.  
 
The Russian media has played a more direct role in resistance cultural identity 
formation. Since the Russian newspapers are quite popular among a minority, and there 
is no language barrier, it can be said that they are very influential and directly influence 
many Estonian Russians to construct resistance identity. The media often use the topic 
of shared allegiance to Russian culture, the common Russianness of those who live in 
Russia and in the post-Soviet states, and encourage foreign Russians to preserve their 
Russianness at any cost. The policy of integration is viewed as a threat to Russian 
culture, while those who resist it are promoted and encouraged. In many cases those 
Russians who have decided to integrate into Estonian society have received far less 
attention than the resisting ones to make an impression that all the Estonian Russians 
embrace resistance identity and rely on the Russian Federation. Thus, all that measures 
can make some Estonian Russians feel that resistance is better than integration, and they 
will build their cultural identity on the principles of resisting the dominant culture. 
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In the Russian media there is a tendency to perceive the Estonian Russian minority as 
oppressed and stigmatized, and the Russian Federation as the only hope. The article by 
the deputy editor Yuri Moiseenko (2009) in Argymenty i Fakty is an example of this 
attitude. Its author notes that the Estonian government has adopted ―the task of the 
destruction of the Russian world‖ in order to make the local Russians be ―people 
without a motherland, without culture – without this national ground that makes a 
Russian person Russian‖ (Moiseenko 2009). He proclaims that Russian culture and 
language are forbidden in Estonia, and the only hope of Estonian Russians is the help of 
the Russian Federation.  
 
The articles, which portray integration into Estonian society as a way of losing a 
person‘s Russianness and intentionally distort the information on the aims of the 
Estonian government‘s minority policy, may be a strong factor pushing some Estonian 
Russians towards closer relations with the Russian Federation, their self-isolation from 
Estonian social life and therefore organizing collective resistance against the alleged 
destruction of their Russian world. Nevertheless, the Russian media does not use only 
the fear of losing a Russian worldview, but also applies the theme of Soviet history 
perception (more specifically, the issue of whether the Soviet presence was fraternal 
help or occupation).  
 
Commonly the majority of the media of the Russian Federation offers an idealized view 
on the Soviet period, while the Estonian review of the past is harshly criticized. The 
following articles will be discussed to demonstrate it.  The deputy editor Aleksandra 
Samarina in her article (2009) published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta idealizes the Soviet 
era and criticizes the reevaluation of it as something blasphemous. According to her, the 
new educational policy of Estonia and other former republics of the Soviet Union is 
unfair, since it views the Soviet presence as only negative. Samarina (2009) notes that 
in modern Estonia ―all the benefits that the union republics received from the USSR are 
thoroughly concealed‖; the fruits of mutual co-existence and cooperation of Estonians 
and Russians in Soviet period are said to be ignored by Estonian educational policy. 
Samarina herself perceives the Soviet era in Estonia as totally positive.  
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Sergei Orlov‘s editorial (2009) in Svobodnaya Pressa is an example of the same one-
sided view of the Soviet period. Although the article mostly concentrates on criticism of 
post-Soviet Estonian educational and language policy, the author pays some attention 
on the Soviet period as if contrasting Soviet and modern Estonia. He states that ―during 
the Soviet period, called [in modern Estonia] ‗the years of the atrocities‘ the Estonian 
language did not die, but received development and assistance‖ (Orlov 2009). Orlov 
notes that almost all the elite of the modern republic of Estonia graduated from the 
Soviet universities; according to him, ―in bourgeois Estonia these people who to a major 
extent have a rural background would not have had any chance of higher education‖ 
(ibid.). 
 
Although these two articles do not call on Estonian Russians to resist in a direct way, 
for me it is clear that the articles of such type in the Russian media make readers 
perceive the Soviet period as only positive one, while Estonian re-evaluation of it is 
portrayed as something blasphemous and offensive to Russians. At the same time this 
Russian picture is one-sided just as only negative view on the Soviet past. Leaders of 
the USSR funded the development of Estonia, and its people lived better than in many 
union republics, but at the same time in the Soviet period many Estonians were purged 
and sent to Siberia. Today the Russian media concentrates only on this funding and 
development of Estonia under the Soviet rule, while the Estonian one focuses only on 
repression. Both pictures are incomplete and one-sided. However, in this antagonism of 
approaches to the Soviet history many Estonian Russians prefer to take Russia‘s side. 
As I have said, the older generation of Estonian Russians commonly perceives any 
criticism of the USSR as a personal offense. Thus, the Russian media speculating about 
the past makes them to construct the identity which is based on the rejection of Estonian 
image of history, the resistance to the imposed view of the Soviet Union. As a result of 
this resistance, many Estonian Russians identify themselves with Russians of Russia.  
 
The Estonian Russian media could be viewed as the most influential constructor of 
Estonian Russians‘ resistance identity. In many cases some Russians cannot read the 
Estonian newspapers, so the Estonian Russian dailies are their only source of 
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information. Given that fact, the media of the minority has a significant impact on some 
Estonian Russians and the construction of their cultural identity.  
 
Although the resistance mood is not shared by all the journalists, some of them propose 
the way of antagonism to the dominant culture as a positive measure of protection of 
Russianness. The most radical ones offer self-segregation as the best way. The Estonian 
Russian sociologist Valeria Boltova‘s article (2010) in the newspaper Vesti is an 
innovative example of this approach to Estonian Russians‘ cultural identity 
construction, since it promotes the ideas of self-segregation of the minority. According 
to her, ―Russians in Estonia should build a big barrier between themselves and 
Estonians to survive and to preserve their national specificity and culture‖; Russians and 
Estonians should live independently from each other (Boltova 2010). She proclaims that 
the Estonian state only takes care of Estonian culture; so, Russians should preserve their 
identity on their own account (ibid.). The only force which will be able to help them is 
the Russian Federation (ibid.).  
 
One can note that this article is very similar to those which are published in Russia. The 
indifferent Estonian attitude towards Russian culture is emphasized as much as possible, 
while no attention at all is paid to the possibility of Russians‘ successful integration into 
Estonian society. On the contrary, the article encourages people not to integrate and not 
to have contacts with Estonian culture. Under the influence of this message, some 
Russians prefer to base their cultural identity on the barrier from any contacts and to 
guard their Russianness from any impact of Estonian culture. They voluntarily choose 
the way of the self-segregation, ignoring the possibility of integration; the resistance 
principle of their cultural identity is promoted. 
 
There is a tendency in the Estonian Russia media that some radical articles do not only 
promote self-segregation, but also emphasize the differences between Estonians and 
Russians, and the Estonian state indifference to the minority as a reason to avoid mutual 
contacts. The following article is an innovative example of this tendency. The Estonian 
Russian journalist Jana Toom‘s article (2008) in Stolitsa is an interview with Maxim 
Reva, one of the resistance movement leaders who perceives Estonian governmental 
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policy as a ―cultural genocide‖ and openly promotes self-segregation (Toom 2008). 
Maxim Reva expresses the opinion that Estonian Russians and Estonians cannot be 
united: they are too different. ―We and Estonians have a different history. I will never 
agree that my grandfather was an occupier‖ (ibid.). On the whole, he does not believe 
that Estonia can be motherland for the local Russians since the Estonian state does not 
need Russians. Reva encourages Estonian Russians to ―wash our hands of the affair‖ of 
Estonia and pay attention to the preservation of their Russianness, work with the 
younger generation and cooperate with the Russian Federation.  
 
Some other articles in the Estonian Russian media can be viewed as an example of the 
Russian Federation‘s means of influencing resistance identity building. Although the 
majority of them is far less radical than the previous articles, and commonly does not 
offer a way of self-segregation as the best solution to the problems of cultural 
preservation, the tendency of promoting the ideas of all-Russian unity appears to be 
popular among them. It is not surprising that according to many articles logic, this unity 
should be led by the Russian Federation, and Russian diasporas abroad should follow it. 
On the one hand, nobody calls Estonian Russians to resist integration. On the other 
hand, the mentioned unity presupposes that there will not be any separate Estonian 
Russian culture, and Baltic Russians will follow Russia. This obedience can inevitably 
lead to the controversy and consequently to the resistance to Estonian cultural policy. 
Therefore, these articles also promote the resistance identity among Estonian Russians. 
 
The article by one of Estonian Russian cultural associations leaders Boris Krooming-
Suharev (2002) in Molodoj Estonii promotes all-Russian unity and claims that the 
Russian culture of Estonian Russians can be preserved only by close cooperation with 
Russia (Krooming-Suharev 2002). Krooming-Suharev emphasizes the necessity of 
creation of a ―united Russian space‖; Russia and Russian diasporas abroad should unite 
their spiritual life for further development of Russian culture (ibid.). The possibility of 
Estonian Russian culture‘s separate existence is not even discussed. Thus, this article is 
also an example of orienting Estonian Russian cultural identity towards the Russian 
Federation; the preservation of cultural specificity is connected only to the help of 
Russia.  
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On the whole, part of the Estonian Russian media prevents local Russians from 
choosing the way of project cultural identity construction and presents the united 
Russian culture as a preferable object of self-identification. Undoubtedly, this point of 
view is not expressed by all the Estonian Russian media and not all the Russians in the 
land identify themselves with this culture. Nevertheless this approach to the question of 
identity has its admirers in Estonia. The Russian media argument about the way of 
integration as a threat to Russianness is often repeated in the Estonian media. As a result 
some Estonian Russians prefer self-segregation to integration and stay in their little 
world to build a resistance identity. However, in many cases Russians stay in this world 
unwillingly, because Estonian society sometimes does not accept them. Their resistance 
identity can be a form of response to their offence (speculation of Soviet occupation, 
over-criticism of Russians‘ role in Estonian history, exclusivist views of some 
Estonians) rather than a means to save their Russianness or avoid integration. 
 
The borders of the Russian minority‘s world do not cover only culture, information 
system and education: they also include the sphere of everyday life. Hobbies, 
entertainment, sports, leisure, social associations – all of these also have their Russian 
analogues in Estonia (Russkiy portal 2009). It seems to me that it can be named some 
form of hidden Russian community life. Estonian Russians can join their own 
associations (scouts‘, war veterans‘, teachers‘ associations), visit Russian rock-clubs 
and discos, listen to Russian bands, eat in Russian restaurants and cafés – thus, the 
significant part of their life can be hidden from Estonian population. Russians can live 
in their little world with no or only few contacts with Estonia and Estonians.  
 
According to Russkiy portal, the creation of the Estonian Russian information system 
and cultural space, allows Russians ―to form their own isolated world of Estonian 
Russians who observe events in Russia and on the territory of Estonia from a particular 
point of view, and build up their own subculture‖ (Russkiy portal 2009). Estonians 
complain that some Estonian ―Russians still consider themselves as a part of Russia. 
They are not interested in Estonian sports, Estonian TV, Estonian language, Estonian 
culture and history‖ (Burlakov 2008). This situation has found its reflection in the 
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humor of Estonian Russians – in the 1990s there had appeared the popular joke: ―I will 
go to Tallinn to see Estonia‖ (Russkiy portal 2009). Thus, in the 1990s many Estonian 
Russians did not perceive their periphery provinces as Estonia, if the only place to see 
Estonia according to their logic was the capital region.  
 
The tendency to isolation has sometimes led to absurd incidents: in the ―Russian‖ 
province of Ida-Virumaa the election poster of Edgar Savisaar, who had been depicted 
while playing chess, was perceived by local Russians as an advertisement of some 
famous chess player coming to town (Russkiy portal 2009). This situation of knowing 
nothing about the Estonian election candidates serves to demonstrate how a proportion 
of Estonian Russians has not been interested in the political life of Estonia. In the border 
regions local Russians come to the Russian Federation and back many times a day as to 
the market square or to the neighbor street to buy food, newspapers, visit friends and 
relatives on the other side of the border. Thus, some Estonian Russians resist the 
ongoing Estonianisation through hiding in their little Russian world and through active 
participation in the fight for their better position in Estonian society via their political 
organizations.  
 
On the whole, in the 1990s-2000s some Russians constructed a resistance identity, and 
the media played a significant role in this construction. According to Castells (2005: 8), 
resistance identity is created by those people who are in positions devalued by the logic 
of domination; in that case their resistance is caused by the desire to save their identity 
and to oppose the principles imposed by the dominating group. The process of this 
identity creation is still contributed by the media of Estonia, Russia and the Estonian 
Russian community. The media can be viewed as an important constructor of the 
Estonian Russian resistance identity. On the whole, the media of the Russian Federation 
and the Estonian Russian community make the readers identify themselves with pure 
Russian culture and avoid integration and Estonian Russian cultural identity 
construction. At the same time the Estonian media view the way of resistance identity as 
something dangerous but also recognize that this way is chosen by many Russians in the 
state. Nevertheless, as this study will demonstrate, the Estonian media present the way 
of the project identity as more suitable. 
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6 TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MINORITY IN TERMS OF 
PROJECT IDENTITY 
 
 
This chapter will focus on another phenomenon of Estonian Russians‘ cultural identity 
transformation. A significant proportion of Russians has not accepted the idea of a 
resistance identity and wants peaceful adaptation to the new life. The cultural identity of 
these people has changed during this adaptation; they use the elements of Estonian and 
Russian cultures to construct their identity which differs from the identity of Russians 
from the Russian Federation and the resistance identity of some Estonian Russians. This 
new identity, I argue, is close to Manuel Castells‘ idea of project identity.  
 
According to Manuel Castells (1997: 8), project identity is the creation of a new identity 
on the basis of available cultural material. This new identity redefines the position of its 
builders in society, and seeks a transformation of the overall social structure. Castells 
relates this description to social identity in the specific contexts of a network society. 
Nevertheless, the research suggests that this term of project identity also suits the 
situation of Estonian Russians‘ cultural identity transformation. As he explains, ―the 
building of identity is a project of a different life, perhaps on the basis of an oppressed 
identity, but expanding toward the transformation of a society‖ (ibid.).  
 
He provides the example of feminism, which does not only seek to create a new female 
identity, but also to change the whole structure of society and the family (Castells 2005: 
8). If one compares this example with the situation in Estonia, one can see that they 
have some similarities. As feminists wish to establish the new identity of a liberated 
woman, some Russians want to construct a new identity which will unite their inherited 
allegiance to Russian culture with their loyalty to Estonia and its culture. Feminists look 
for a society which would be drastically changed by the transformation in women‘s 
position, while Russians in Estonia want to live in a society where the problem of 
Estonian-Russian relations is solved. They dream of a society where Estonian Russians 
could live in harmony with Estonians, and their cultures would peacefully coexist. 
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Nevertheless, at the beginning of this chapter I should repeat what I have stated in 
introduction. Many sources which are applied in the chapter, including the work of 
Tampere, view too optimistically those Estonian Russians who are constructing a 
project identity. In fact, the situation in Estonia is not very smooth, and the tension 
between two nations still exists, and it is clear that the successful solution to the 
problems of Estonian Russians will demand decades. At the same time Tampere often 
views the situation as if these problems have already been solved. However, as the 
Bronze Night showed they have not. Some groups of Estonian Russians support the 
integration, some do not. 
 
In the 1990s the Russian community split into those who resisted Estonianisation, and 
those who wished to adapt; this division is to some extent connected with the split of the 
generations. It is necessary to explain how heterogeneous the Russian minority is, since 
this heterogeneity is the source of difference of the attitudes towards the Russians‘ 
cultural identification. Belonging to a particular group often defines a person‘s view on 
their cultural identity.  
 
The Russian sociologist and journalist Vladislav Shurygin (2005) proposes an overtly 
simplified categorisation of Estonian Russians. The whole Russian population of 
Estonia can be divided into three groups. The first group is the older generation, mostly 
senior citizens and retirees. They feel a strong nostalgia for the Soviet period. As the 
Russian newspaper Zavtra writes, ―They are the people for whom modern Estonia will 
never become their home state‖ (Shurygin 2005).  Their worldview is the old Soviet-
style worldview, and their identity is ―connected with the communist past, which was 
benevolent and provided a lot of privileges‖ (Tampere 2005: 156). Their motherland is 
the Soviet Union, where the major part of their life was spent, and where they were the 
Big Brothers to the other nationalities of the USSR (ibid. 172). Obviously, for this 
generation integration into the new Estonian society is very difficult. They have been 
strongly influenced by Soviet ideology, and they do not want to lose their once 
dominant and privileged position (ibid. 144). ―They opposed Estonian re-independence 
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and they did not understand the changes taking place in Estonia, which were against 
their religion‖ (ibid. 144–145). 
 
The second group is quite close to the first. It consists of the people who were adults on 
the eve of the fall of the USSR (Shurygin 2005). In the 1990s these people also faced 
the difficulties of integration into the new world. Their identity often resembles that of 
the first group, and their motherland is the Soviet Union rather than Estonia. In post-
Soviet Estonia they are concentrating on their family life rather than on national politics 
(ibid.). In that point I cannot totally agree with Shurygin. As the fourth chapter on the 
history demonstrated, in the 1990s the older generation was very active in national 
politics and tried to influence the Estonian government. The Russian organizations and 
parties were usually created by the first and second groups of Shurygin‘s classification. 
As he states, although the majority of the second group resist Estonianisation and build 
up a resistance Russian identity, some people try to adapt. They study the official 
language, apply for citizenship, get acquainted with Estonian culture and identify 
themselves with Estonian Russians. However, the third group – Estonian Russian young 
people – is the most active in the new cultural identity building. Therefore, this chapter 
will concentrate mostly on them. 
 
The third group is the younger generation of Estonian Russians who were born either in 
the last years of the Soviet Union or in the 1990s. Their attitude to Estonianisation and 
the new reality of life is generally more enthusiastic. The specificity of Estonian 
Russian young people is in the fact that they perceive their country of living as their 
motherland. This phenomenon has eased their successful adaptation to the new 
conditions. They do not personally remember the years of Soviet domination over 
Estonia, and, despite the fact that a significant proportion of them were born in the 
Soviet Union, they do not look on the USSR as the motherland. Nor do they perceive 
the Russian Federation as their home: ―Commonly for the Russian children growing up 
in Estonia the motherland of their parents has already become alien‖ (Russkiy portal 
2009). They have not seen the privileged position of the Russian community during the 
Soviet time. Another factor influencing young Estonian Russians is the absence of the 
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ideological impact of Communism on them. The younger generation has been less 
influenced by party propaganda than their parents.  
 
Nevertheless, the young people do not deny their Russianness, and allegiance to 
Russian culture, since it is their families‘ culture, and this younger generation was 
raised up in the atmosphere of Russian culture. I should admit that Shurygin‘s division 
of Estonian Russians is fairly simplified. The attitude to integration is not always 
connected to the allegiance to these groups. In many cases some proportion of the 
younger generation expresses the resistant tendency and demonstrates loyalty to the 
Russian Federation, although generally young Estonian Russians prefer to build up 
project identity and are more loyal to Estonia than to Russia. 
 
The younger Russians have had contact with Estonian culture and language from 
childhood. For them it is easier to adapt to the new conditions, since the language is not 
a problem for them. They learn Estonian almost from the first years of their life and can 
speak it as a second mother tongue. The constant interaction between both Russian 
culture of their families and Estonian culture of the surrounding reality has led to the 
phenomenon of Estonian Russians‘ younger generation living between two cultures, 
Estonian and Russian. This position between two cultures has led to a problem of self-
identification. 
 
As Estonian Russians themselves admit, for their younger generation the question of 
cultural self-identification in the 1990s was rather painful, since they could not exactly 
say to which culture they belonged. They were born in the period of a vacuum, when the 
Soviet Union had already collapsed, and the Russian Federation had become for them a 
foreign state. According to Russian opinion polls, in the 1990s about 40 per cent of 
Estonian Russian young people faced difficulties while trying to define their identity 
(Russkiy portal 2009). As the members of the Russian community in the country said, 
―The identity split for Russians in Estonia became the familiar and inevitable stage of 
personal development‖ (ibid.). Finally the cultural identity of young Estonian Russians 
has taken the form – ―I am not Estonian, I am not Russian, but I am Estonian Russian‖ 
(ibid.). 
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In the 1990s a new cultural identity emerged. Therefore, today the younger generation 
identifies with Russians in Estonia or Estonian Russians - not the nationality, but the 
identity (Russkiy portal 2009). They identify themselves as Russians in Estonia or the 
native Russians of Estonia (Tampere 2005: 172). In the sphere of cultural identity these 
people are on some invisible border between Russia and Estonia. As Laitin (1998: 160) 
states, ―the (nonlinguistic) cultural divide separating Russians and Estonians is 
eroding‖. They accept the cultural practices of Estonians, their rituals and norms, and 
they take on cultural characteristics once thought to be distinctive of Estonians. In the 
1990s all Estonian Russians were viewed by Estonians as the people who did not 
understand the Estonian ―sense of reserve, privacy, keeping one‘s personal distance‖ 
(ibid. 159). But now, in the 2000s many Russians in Estonian towns interact in public 
places far more like Estonians than Russians in Moscow: they are quieter and more 
respectful of privacy. According to Western social polls, many Russians in Estonia feel 
themselves closer in basic values to Estonians than to Russians in Russia (ibid.). 
Sometimes, looking at the behavior of Estonians and Estonian Russians, even Estonians 
cannot distinguish between them, since the significant proportion of the younger 
Estonian Russian generation has accepted the norms of Estonia (ibid. 159-161).  
 
The construction of this new cultural identity has been strongly influenced by the 
media. It cannot be only a mechanism guaranteeing cultural identity; it is also a creator 
of this identity (Giesen 1996: 2). Thus, Estonian Russian cultural identity has to some 
extent been built up by the media, both the Estonian, Russian, and Estonian Russian. 
The media represent the views of the minority which has decided to integrate into 
Estonian society, to identify with Russians living in Estonia, and to accept Estonian 
culture. The term ―Estonian Russian‖ is actively used in the press, which has gradually 
made it popular. Estonian Russians themselves use the media to demonstrate their 
specific cultural identity.  
 
The writer of this study will now discuss the role of the media in Estonian Russians‘ 
cultural identity creation. The Estonian media have made the contribution to Estonian 
Russians‘ cultural identity construction, although the articles on the topic of the Russian 
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minority demonstrate the variety of the attitudes towards the minority. Descriptions of 
the Russian-language population include both negative (excluding membership of 
society) and positive ones (the enthusiasm) (Tampere 2005: 165–166). According to the 
Estonian media, local Russians‘ identity has considerably changed, and Russians who 
have lived in Estonia for a long time are not like Russians in Russia any more (ibid.). 
The media also note that many Russians regard Estonia as their homeland (ibid.). 
Sometimes the media use the concept of ―our country‖ while writing about Estonian 
Russians. This ―our country‖ is loved and respected by either Estonians or Estonian 
Russians (ibid. 166). At the same time the newspapers sometimes tell their readers 
about the relative closeness between Estonians and Estonian Russians: ―we are not so 
different‖ (Repson 2010). Estonian Russian young people who speak Estonian fluently 
are encouraged by the media. Those of the Russian population who express a desire to 
integrate into Estonian society are called ―our‖ Estonian Russians (Palo 2010). 
Nevertheless, we cannot fully agree with Tampere, whose view on the media role is too 
optimistic. As was demonstrated in the fourth chapter, a significant proportion of the 
Estonian media can only criticize Estonian Russians and deny their closeness to 
Estonians, although some articles contribute to integration in a more objective way. 
 
The topic of Estonian Russian integration in the media is an influential factor of 
Estonian Russian cultural identity establishment. The articles ―Интеграция начинается 
с молодых‖ [Integration begins from the youth] (2010) by Urve Palo and ―Прозябание 
русских партий говорит об интеграции‖ [Stagnation of Russian parties is a testimony 
of integration] (2010) by Alo Raun  in the major Estonian newspaper Postimees are the 
interesting examples of Estonian Russian perception. In fact, both articles recognize that 
Russians have taken steps towards of their integration, and should not be considered as 
disloyal. 
 
In the first article, the former minister of population Urve Palo notes that there is a need 
to integrate Estonian Russians. She also emphasizes that some success in their 
integration has already been achieved (Palo 2010). In her opinion, the forefront of this 
integration consists of younger Estonian Russians, and the results of the integration 
depend on them. ―If Estonian and Russian children will spend more time together, it 
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promises for us a more tolerant society in the future‖ (ibid.). At the same time many 
Estonian Russians have already demonstrated their desire to integrate. As Palo writes, 
―we take pride that our young Estonian Russians speak Estonian increasingly better‖ 
(ibid.). She notes that 60 per cent of Estonians and Estonian Russians want their 
children to attend kindergartens with Estonian as the language of instruction together; 
she proposes that the ongoing integration should be deepened by the efforts of both 
sides (ibid.). At the same time she emphasizes that Russian culture and language in the 
Estonian Russian schools should not be ignored.  
 
Thus, this article represents a view of Estonian Russian identity, its recognition by 
Estonians. Young Estonian Russians are not only ―our‖ Estonians: they also are a 
source of pride. They are willing to integrate into Estonian society, they do not show a 
desire to be isolated from Estonians. In fact, their cultural identity is promoted by this 
article, since it acknowledges that many Estonian Russians are loyal to Estonia, are 
―ours‖. Estonian Russian identity, which is to some extent based on integration is 
encouraged to further development; the exclusive view on Russians of the 1990s has 
been replaced by the assumption that at least Estonian Russian young people are loyal 
to Estonia and its culture.  
 
Estonian journalist Alo Raun‘s article (2010) is another example of the new perception 
of Estonian Russians. According to Raun, many Estonian Russians have been integrated 
into Estonian society, and have had the same political preferences as Estonians (Raun 
2010). The evidence is simple: according to the sociologists, ―Russian-speaking and 
Russian national parties have not been successful. Russians do not support ―their‖ 
parties sufficiently and do not vote for them‖ (ibid.). Alo Raun emphasizes that this 
situation means that Estonian Russians vote for Estonian political parties, and their 
integration is a fact (ibid.). Raun also notes that in many small towns of Estonia 
Estonian Russians speak the official language fluently and are perceived by Estonians 
as compatriots (ibid.).  
 
One can notice that in this article there is the same attitude to Estonian Russians as in 
the article of Urve Palo: they are viewed as the supporters of integration, loyal 
 67 
 
compatriots, adherents of Estonian political parties. Their cultural identity is supported 
by the acknowledgement of their closeness to Estonians (they vote for the same political 
parties), while those Russians who wish to resist Estonianisation are viewed as 
―stagnating‖ (Raun 2010). In this article one can see the duality of the Russian image in 
the Estonian media. Those Russians who have constructed a resistance identity are 
viewed in negative terms, while Estonian Russians with a project identity have a more 
positive image. Nevertheless, the claim that the Russian parties are stagnating seems to 
me non-objective, because there are still some parties and organizations of the Russian 
minority which promote resistance and have their supporters. 
 
Often Estonian Russians use interviews in the Estonian newspapers as a means of 
publicly proclaiming their Estonian Russian identity. For example, in Estonian Russian 
journalist Andrei Babin‘s article (2007) in Postimees, the interviewee Anatoli Shmigun, 
an Estonian Russian sportsman, declares that ―I feel that I am not the Russian who lives 
in Russia. I am the local, Estonian Russian‖ (Babin 2007). On the one hand, the 
interviewee admits that he has not been entirely assimilated and does not want to 
become entirely Estonian. On the other, he emphasizes that he has become Estonian 
Russian, and for him Estonia is his homeland. Thus, through the media many Estonian 
Russians strengthen the position of their cultural identity by proclaiming their loyalty to 
Estonia and rejecting the Russian Federation. 
 
Thus, the Estonian media admit that the Russian community in Estonia is not 
homogeneous, and that some Russians have created a specific Estonian Russian cultural 
identity. These Estonian Russians do not resemble Soviet Russians, and they express 
respect towards Estonian culture in the sphere of language, history, and traditions. Their 
loyalty is often emphasized by the media; in fact, the articles demonstrate a new image 
of Estonian Russian – from occupier and alien to a source of pride and ―our‖ Estonian 
Russian, while those who have chosen resistance identity are viewed as the fifth column 
of Moscow. This image is a simplified one, since it ignores the people who are loyal 
both to Estonia and Russia and do not recognize the Soviet presence as occupation, or 
those who are neutral to both cultures. 
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Although the major attention of the Russian media is paid to those Russians who have 
created a resistance identity and do not wish to integrate or adapt, sometimes they also 
write about those who have turned from Russians into Estonian Russians. Just like the 
Estonian media, the Russian one admits that some Russians living in Estonia do not 
resemble Russians in Russia any more. They tell about the phenomenon of Estonian 
Russians – the people who have adapted to Estonian society and identify themselves 
with Estonia rather than with Russia (Trifonov 2009). 
 
Due to the claims of some Estonian Russians about their otherness and closeness to 
Europe and European values, the Russian Federation mass media sometimes ironically 
call Estonian Russians ―Euro-Russians‖ (ibid.). In fact, many young Estonian Russians 
look like Europeans in appearance, behavior and worldview. At the same time this 
assumption is close to a stereotype, since those Estonian Russians who accept the 
European character do not always deny their Russianness. The Russian editor Michail 
Chernov‘s article (2004) in RBK Daily is a revisionist example of Russians‘ approach to 
Estonian Russians‘ cultural identity. Chernov (2004) admits their otherness, and 
emphasizes that these people ―were not at all the ‗fifth column‘ of Russia in the Baltic 
republics‖. According to him, the significant proportion of Baltic Russians do not feel 
any sympathies towards Russia, and wish to integrate into a united Europe (ibid.). 
Despite the precedents of discrimination, Baltic Russians are the patriots of their 
republics and support the idea of independence from Russia. In their minds Russia is 
associated with a low level of life, crime, and corruption of the civil service (ibid.). On 
the whole, the article is critical towards Estonian Russians for their stereotypical views 
on the Russian Federation, and lack of Russian patriotism.  
 
In Chernov‘s view, Estonian Russians are more enthusiastic about Estonia and the 
European Union than about the Russian Federation: ―Baltic Russians are in fact 
Europeans in their minds‖ (Chernov 2004). Thus, the article demonstrates Estonian 
Russians‘ opposition to Russia: for them their homeland is a place of stability, peace 
and prosperity, while the Russian Federation is perceived as something negative and 
dangerous. Their future is in Estonia, in Europe, but not in Russia. Their self-
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identification is based on the assumption that they are Europeans; to them European 
order and stability are more preferable than Russian chaos.  
 
The editorial by the Russian journalist Michail Shurygin (2005), published in the 
newspaper Zavtra, also pays attention to the points of difference from Russia. Shurygin 
states that to younger Estonian Russian ―modern Estonia is their life‖ (ibid.). This part 
of the Russian community lives in Estonia, perceives the surrounding world as its own, 
and identifies itself with this world (ibid.). For the younger generation Russia is only 
some spiritual category, a part of family history and cultural tradition rather than some 
real motherland (ibid.). Young Estonian Russians are in general more active and free 
than young people in Russia: they know many foreign languages, travel in Europe and 
study in European universities.  
 
Shurygin also emphasizes that many Estonian Russians are disappointed in Russia and 
that this disappointment makes them different from Russians of the Russian Federation. 
Many Estonian Russians feel that ―in the most difficult years Russia simply cheated its 
compatriots and betrayed them‖ (Shurygin 2005). As Michail Shurygin (ibid.) writes, 
this feeling of ―national orphanage‖ causes the existing attitude towards the Russian 
Federation, which varies from total disappointment and negation to proud indifference. 
On the whole, this article acknowledges that the younger generation has already 
acquired a specific Estonian Russian identity, while a significant proportion of the older 
generation does not feel sympathy towards Russia, which did not help the community in 
the 1990s. It is an acknowledgement of the independent character of Estonian Russian 
culture, which perceives Estonia as the homeland, while Russia is the ancestors‘ 
motherland. These articles have had an influence on Estonian Russian cultural identity 
creation, since they have emphasized and justified the sovereignty of Estonian Russians, 
and have not pretended to make them feel themselves the same as Russians in the 
Russian Federation, and even have admitted Russian guilt before them.  
 
One can note some distinction between those who resist and those who integrate in the 
articles of the Russian media. If the Russian media pay attention to the Russian 
community, they commonly use the term ―Russians in Estonia‖, while if they rarely 
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touch upon the issue of those who have the mixed Estonian-Russian cultural identity, 
they use the term ―Estonian Russians‖ (Novaya Gazeta 2003) or ―Baltic Russians‖ 
(Trifonov 2005).  The media emphasizes that those who wish to integrate have become 
another kind of Russian who shares the values of Estonian culture (ibid.), and whose 
Russian identity is eroding (Smerdova 2007). The Russian media admit that Estonian 
Russians have their own cultural identity, and could not be viewed as ―ordinary 
Russians‖ any more. The Estonian Russian media also influence their identity creation. 
 
The Estonian and Russian media have made much for Estonian Russian cultural 
identity, but the major contribution has been made by the Estonian Russian media. It 
was they who started to use the term ―Estonian Russian‖ more actively. Some of them 
emphasize the split between Russians and Estonian Russians. According to many 
columnists, Estonian Russians are better than Russians. For instance, in the newspaper 
Narvskaja gazeta the journalist Aleksandr Mauzer demonstrates this opinion and 
criticizes the Russian town of Ivangorod as ―the graveyard of Narva history‖ because of 
Russians‘ indifference to its historical and architectural treasures (Mauzer 2009). His 
article is very interesting, since it can be an example of some Estonian Russians‘ 
negative attitude to the culture of the Russian Federation. Looking at the bad condition 
of ancient mansions and graveyards in Russia, Aleksandr Mauzer makes the statement: 
―For us, true Europeans, it was a shocking sight‖ (Mauzer 2009).  
 
Thus, Russians in the Russian Federation and Estonian Russians are opposed in the 
article; the latter are ―true Europeans‖, civilized and refined, who would not allow the 
history to be destroyed, and the former are some barbarians (although the article does 
not use this word, Aleksandr Mauzer bitterly complains of Russians‘ indifference to 
their culture and its architectural treasures, and it is clear that he considers Russian 
Russians to be inferior than Estonian Russians), who do not care for the preservation of 
ancient monuments. At the end of the article it is said that in Ivangorod the situation is 
so bad that ―we [Estonian Russians] feel the shame‖ (ibid.). Another sign! Russians and 
Estonian Russians are divided into ―they‖ and ―we‖, which means that some Estonian 
Russians in their media reject their mutual close relationship, and tell about Estonian 
 71 
 
Russian uniqueness, at the same time emphasizing the closeness between Estonian 
Russians and Estonians. 
 
Some Estonian Russian media contribute to the construction of Estonian Russian 
cultural identity by re-defining the relations between Estonian and Russian culture, and 
emphasizing the shared values of Estonians and Estonian Russians. Narvskaja Gazeta 
writes about the necessity of creating new shared Estonian-Russian values to unite the 
society (Denisov 2010). The Estonian Russian editor Rodion Denisov (2010) 
emphasizes the necessity of being united, since the situation of Estonian-Russian 
confrontation in the country is used by ―unfriendly forces to harm our state‖. According 
to his article (2010), ―one of these values could be our history‖ (ibid.). Thus, Denisov 
perceives Estonian Russians as the same citizens of the country as Estonians, and in his 
view Estonia is ―our‖ state, while Estonian history is ―our‖ history. He admits that this 
history has had periods of ―alienation between our nations‖, although there also were 
episodes when both Estonians and Russians acted together (ibid.). ―Why does Estonian 
historiography say nothing about those Russians who fought together with Estonians at 
the dawn of Estonian sovereignty?‖ (ibid.).  At the same time the Soviet period, which 
destroyed this peaceful tradition, has to be forgotten, Denisov proposes.  
 
Rodion Denisov offers some measures to popularize Estonian-Russian shared history. ―I 
am sure that it is necessary to begin state-supported research of our state with the 
emphasis on the contribution to its creation which was made by the representatives of 
all the peoples living in Estonia‖ (Denisov 2010). New studies, textbooks, leaflets, 
media articles and web-sites on the topic of shared history have to be established (ibid.). 
On the whole, this article represents Estonian Russians‘ new approach to their cultural 
identity and history. In the Soviet period the topic of the Liberation war or Russians 
fighting together with Estonians was not discussed by the media, and Russians based 
their cultural identity on such historical events as the Great Patriotic war and 
communism-building in the post-war decades. Now the cultural identity of those who 
wish to integrate is built upon the episodes of being and fighting together: the 
Liberation war and the Russian Empire period. If one applies Geert Hofstede‘s (2005: 
7) concept of heroes as one form of culture manifestation while working with the media, 
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it is possible to note that in the articles this new Estonian Russian cultural identity uses 
a new set of heroes – the heroes common to the imperial and sovereignty period, and the 
heroes common to Estonians and Russians. The Estonian Russian media also 
emphasizes not only shared heroes and shared history, but also the shared culture of 
Estonian Russians. 
 
The Estonian Russian newspaper Molodoj Estonii wrote in 2009 that Estonian and 
Russian cultures were related to each other, and the distance of alienation between them 
was being reduced by the efforts of Estonian artists (Ashihmin 2009). The article was 
entitled ―Сближение параллельных миров‖ [The convergence of the parallel worlds] 
(2009). Estonian Russian deputy editor Evgeni Ashihmin (ibid.) admitted that ―Estonian 
and Russian cultures in Estonia are like the parallel worlds‖. In his words, they were 
related, but they also differed from each other, and there was still much 
misunderstanding and prejudice (ibid.). Nevertheless, due to the efforts of Estonian 
cultural figures the bridges between these parallel worlds were being built. According to 
Ashihmin, these dialogues between the cultures can provide Estonians and Estonian 
Russians with the opportunity to know more about each other. Thus, some Estonian 
Russians have left behind the Soviet image of the Big Brothers of subordinate Estonian 
culture and perceive the latter as an equal one. Estonian Russians‘ cultural identity is 
now built on the principle of respect towards the dominant nation‘s culture rather than 
on the Soviet assumptions of Russians‘ benefactor role.  
 
In 2009 Viru Prospekt described the younger generation of Estonian Russians who 
interacted with Estonian culture from the childhood (Vikulov 2009). As the article on 
the Estonian Russian upper secondary school in Vannalinna (2009) noted, ―for us [the 
teachers and students of the Estonian Russian upper secondary school] it is very 
important to study the culture, and traditions of Estonian people‖ (ibid.). At the same 
time these teachers stated that ―for us the preservation of Russian identity is crucial‖ 
(ibid.). The interviewee, the rector of the school Tatiana Stepanova, stated that in the 
next decade all graduates from Russian upper secondary schools would speak Estonian 
very well. According to her, learning the Estonian language in schools would create a 
generation of loyal Russians speaking Estonian as their second mother tongue (ibid.). 
 73 
 
Thus, the article demonstrates that at least many Estonian Russian teachers think that 
integration is possible without eradicating allegiance to Russian culture. 
 
On the whole, the Estonian Russian media present the image of the new culture and new 
cultural identity which have been made of the elements of both cultures – bilingualism 
of young people who speak Estonian and Russian fluently with respect to the both 
countries‘ traditions, knowledge of the common history of Russia and Estonia, and 
interest in Estonian and Russian culture. The close contacts of two cultures are 
perceived as the perspective of development rather than a threat to Russianness. The 
self-identification with Estonian Russian is not a source of fear or concern, the media 
proclaim. 
 
Thus, the media have played a significant role in the creation of a specific Estonian 
Russian cultural identity creation. Firstly, the media are the means of announcing one‘s 
self-identification, and through the papers Estonian Russians tell about their specificity, 
their difference from Russians living in the Russian Federation, and the distinctive 
features of their local Estonian Russian culture. Secondly, the media demonstrate the 
Estonian attitude towards the new culture and identity, some confirmation of the fact 
that many Estonian Russians are ―our‖ Estonian Russians, more loyal and respectful to 
the country than Soviet Russians. Thirdly, the newspapers and magazines express the 
opinion of the Russian Federation about the new Estonian Russian community and 
culture – recognition of the Estonian Russian otherness, the more European character of 
the community, the erosion of the purely Russian cultural identity and its transformation 
into a mixed Estonian Russian identity. In fact, during the post-Soviet period some 
Estonian Russians have not only accepted Estonian cultural elements, but have also 
mingled them with their Russian ones. 
 
The new Estonian Russian cultural identity is specific, since it often unites and 
intermingles the elements of Russian and Estonian cultures. For instance, in the 1990s 
many Estonian Russian youngsters transformed their names to sound more Estonian-
like, while remaining their Russian names. A girl called Christina (female name 
widespread in Russia) could transform her name into the more Estonian Christiina 
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(Russkiy portal 2009). This girl had accepted some part of Estonian culture, and 
identified herself with this culture, since she decided to transform her name to be more 
suitable for the Estonian environment. Changing one‘s name towards one which is more 
Estonian is an opportunity for better acceptance by the Estonian population (Tampere 
2005: 167). 
 
The Russian language is also an object of cultural influence. The Russian language in 
Estonia differs from the one of Russia. It is not an entirely new language; the main 
difference is that its vocabulary includes some words from the Estonian language. 
Estonian Russians do not even notice that they use the Estonian words while speaking 
Russian (Russkiy portal 2009). For instance, ―such words as kaubamaja, suits, amet etc. 
have truly become a part of the local Russian language‖ (ibid., italics mine). During 
interviews with Estonian Russian young people, the following opinion on the language 
was given: ―I cannot say that I do not have a perfect command of Russian. Sure, I do. It 
is my mother tongue. But my Russian differs from that which is spoken in Russia‖ 
(ibid.). On the other hand, many Estonian Russians, especially young ones, can speak 
Estonian as well as their mother tongue. 
 
When Russians in Estonia faced the language problem after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
many families decided to ease their children‘s integration into the new life through 
attendance at Estonian schools and kindergartens; thus, the children began to study 
Estonian very early. As Estonian Russians themselves admit, for the children and 
teenagers attending Estonian schools the language problem can be solved quite quickly: 
―After some weeks [in Estonian kindergarten] my daughter was able to speak the state 
language fluently‖ (Russkiy portal 2009). Thus, from childhood some Estonian Russian 
children are between two languages, and if Estonian is not a mother tongue for them, it 
is to some extent close to this status. The sphere of history is also an example of two 
cultures intermingling. 
 
In the 1990s some Estonian Russians re-evaluated their view of Estonian-Russian 
coexistence: they united Estonian and Russian images of history. On the one hand, due 
to these changes now, in the 2000s some Russians express respect towards the sacred 
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topics of Estonian history, for instance, the Liberation war of 1918. On the other hand, 
they also draw attention to the deeds of those Russians who participated in these events. 
For example, they speak about ―these Russian people who heroically fought shoulder to 
shoulder with Estonians in the ranks of the Estonian army at the dawn of Estonian 
independence‖ (Denisov 2010). Many Estonian Russians also feel interest in the history 
of the Russian community in the 1920-1930s. 
 
The history of the emigrés‘ community is perceived as an example of the successful 
coexistence of two cultures in sovereign Estonia. On the one hand, Estonian Russian 
articles on this coexistence emphasize the fact that, during the sovereignty decades, 
Russian culture in Estonia was developed, and preserved by the emigrés (Meimre 
2007). On the other hand, according to the articles, Russians in pre-Soviet Estonia did 
not ignore the cultural life of the land, and worked in Estonian media, participated in 
both Estonian and Russian cultural events, and published their books in two languages 
(ibid.). Thus, many Estonian Russians use history to create a new image of the self.  
 
Manuel Castells (1997: 8) notes that project identity is the new identity built by the 
social actors on the basis of any cultural materials available for them in order to redefine 
their position in society. Some Russians in Estonia, after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
have begun to create the new cultural identity on the basis of united elements of 
Estonian and Russian cultures. These elements include language, history, patterns of 
behavior. The self-perception as Estonian Russians with their specific culture (not 
similar to the culture of the Russian Federation), uniting Estonian and Russian ones, can 
help Russians in Estonia to redefine their position in society from the ―occupiers‖, 
―Soviet-period immigrants‖ or ―aliens‖ (Tampere 2005: 169) to patriots and loyal 
citizens of Estonia. However, project identity seeks not only redefinition of its builders‘ 
position, but also their society itself. 
 
According to Castells (1997: 8) project identity tries to transform ―overall social 
structure‖ by redefining the social actors‘ position in society. In the Estonia of the 2000s 
this process of transformation takes place among some part of the Estonian Russian 
community. After sovereignty restoration Estonian society is facing some antagonism 
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between the dominant nation and former country‘s masters – Russians. The existence of 
a significant Russian minority with not always sufficient loyalty to Estonia and its 
culture is a cause of the Estonian people‘s concern. As Kaja Tampere (2005: 172) 
writes, small nations are vulnerable to the political and cultural expansionism of big 
nations; the presence of these enclaves of big nations on the territory of small nations 
only exacerbates the situation. Thus, in Estonia there is an anxiety that the Russian 
community in the country could be an instrument of political pressure from Moscow. 
Therefore, Estonian Russians are perceived by the dominant nation with some degree of 
suspicion. Through their new cultural identity, some Estonian Russians are trying to 
redefine their position in society and change the social structure – to reconcile the split 
between Estonians and Russians. For the achievement of this goal the project identity of 
these Russians has to be based on an open expression of loyalty towards both the 
Estonian state and its culture. 
 
Firstly, the cultural identity of some proportion of Estonian Russians‘ younger 
generation is strongly based on the assumption of Estonia as their homeland; their 
loyalty belongs to Estonia. Kaja Tampere (2005: 172) gives the example of those 
Russians who reached adulthood in the 1990s and now perceive the blue-black-white 
tricolor as ―the flag of their country‖. These Russians are proud of Estonia as their home 
country. For instance, during Eurovision, many Estonian Russians expressed the 
following feelings: ―When I watched Eurovision on TV, I worried about Estonia. I just 
wished that Estonia‘s song would win. Later I was proud of my country‖ (ibid.). The 
anniversary of the Republic of Estonia in 2000 was celebrated by Estonian Russian 
papers (ibid.165). For many Estonian Russians events in the Russian Federation are 
―foreign matters‖, while events in Estonia receive their major interest. According to the 
portal of Estonian Russians, their media can pay some attention to the news from 
Russia, but the major topics are generally the local news (Russkiy portal 2009). At the 
same time Tampere‘s view often does not include those Russians who remain patriots of 
the Russian Federation. The fourth chapter has demonstrated that many of Estonian 
Russians still consider themselves to be Russians. 
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Secondly, some Estonian Russians in the 1990s began to demonstrate their interest in 
Estonian culture to fight the Soviet-period stereotype about the Big Brother who had felt 
indifference towards any culture differing from Russian, or about Russians in Estonia 
who had lived in an isolated Russian world and had been disrespectful and disloyal to 
the culture of their country of domicile. Estonian Russians actively demonstrate that 
Estonian culture is not a culture of some foreign state, but a culture of their homeland, 
and they are loyal to it. They try to persuade Estonians to understand that the new 
generation of Estonian Russians will perceive Estonian culture as part of their cultural 
identity. 
 
Sometimes this demonstration of loyalty is even excessive, since many Estonian 
Russians do their best to prove that they are neither the Soviet-time oppressors of 
Estonian culture, nor rude Russians from the Russian Federation with no respect for 
Estonia. As Laitin (1998: 159) stated, ―some Russians are making conspicuous efforts 
to show that they are different from the Russians in Russia‖. For instance, young 
Estonian Russians who have studied Estonian from childhood criticize the older 
generation for speaking Russian on the street. According to young people, it is ―wrong‖, 
and on the streets people have to use only Estonian (Russkiy portal 2009). In the 1990s 
such situations were not rare in Russian families (ibid.). 
  
In the 1990s some Estonian Russians retreated into an isolated world of the Russian 
language, while others began to get more acquainted with Estonian culture through 
visiting Estonian theatres, reading Estonian literature, and watching Estonian films; the 
problem of language was also being solved. Young Estonian Russians broadly perceive 
the necessity of studying Estonian and passing language test not as offending obligation 
but as an opportunity for a better life, employment, and a perspective for a future career. 
Estonian Russians‘ younger generation has actively begun learning the national 
language and passing the exam for citizenship. All these measures of Estonian Russians 
in creating their project cultural identity are to prove to Estonians that Russians in the 
country are as loyal as the local population, so as to reconcile the society, which was 
split after the fall of the USSR. 
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Some Estonian Russians have made efforts to unite the split society of Estonians and 
Russians around the idea of their common homeland and common history, to eliminate 
the wall between the two cultures, to demonstrate that there is no need of suspicion 
towards Estonian Russians. But have they managed to transform the structure of the 
split Estonian society? It is a deeply controversial question, but it is possible to say that 
they have managed to achieve at least partial success.  
 
A proportion of Estonian society has changed its attitude towards Estonian Russians. 
―Definitions of ―them‖ [Estonian Russians] now display a greater openness (especially 
compared with the early 1990s), and negative and excluding terms show a decreasing 
tendency [sic]‖ (Tampere 2005: 170). Some Estonian political parties, especially the 
moderates and the Centre party, emphasize that the younger generation of the Russian 
minority will become active Estonian citizens and view the Estonian Russian 
community more positively (ibid.). Thus, in the 2000s Estonian Russians are described 
by Estonians also in positive terms - as loyal and active citizens of the country. Some 
partial reconciliation and change of social structure has been achieved. At least some 
proportion of Estonian society does not perceive the Estonian and the Estonian Russian 
communities as opposed to each other. The situation is far from the total reconciliation, 
but the first measures of solving the problem of Estonian-Russian antagonism have been 
taken. The events of April 2007 partially proved that the situation was difficult. 
 
One of the significant watersheds in the history of the Estonian Russian community in 
post-Soviet Estonia was the so-called Bronze Night or April unrest. In April 2007 the 
Estonian authorities relocated the monument of the Great Patriotic war in Tallinn. Since 
the topic of the war heroes is ―sacred‖ for many Russians, this relocation was viewed as 
blasphemous and led to open riots. Some proportion of Estonian Russians condemned 
the relocation but did not support the riots. The media gave a variety of views on the 
event. The Russian media in general viewed the riots as some heroic response of 
patriots, and the Estonian media perceived the unrest as the actions of Russian vandals 
and looters, or criticized either the protesters or the government which relocated the 
monument. The Estonian Russian media condemned the looters but also criticized the 
relocation. 
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The Russian political leaders viewed the situation in negative terms. Vladimir Putin, 
then the president of the Russian Federation, was tough on Estonia after the monument 
relocation and used the media as a means to criticize the decision to relocate the Bronze 
soldier. On the whole, Putin rejected any Estonian claims of Russian guilt and 
condemned the policy of historical re-evaluation of the Great Patriotic war. He noted 
that Estonia had intentionally spoiled relations with the Russian Federation and 
jeopardized the situation by its inappropriate measures, such as the relocation of the war 
monument (RIA Novosti 2007). Putin defined the policy of Estonia as ―ultra-nationalist 
policy which does not take into account either the problems of the fight against Nazism 
or the current situation (ibid.).  Occasionally Putin even used the term ‗neonazism‘ 
while speaking about the re-evaluation of Soviet history in the Baltic countries. 
  
This mood was widely shared in the main Russian newspapers, which commonly 
condemned the Estonian decision to relocate the war monument and justified the 
consequent riots. According to the Russian media, only the Estonian side was guilty of 
the April unrest, while Estonian Russians were patriots protecting their common history 
and the memory of the Great Patriotic war. The resistance to the relocation was viewed 
as heroic. Looting was almost entirely ignored in the media. On the whole, this reaction 
was a part of a trend of promoting resistance among Estonian Russians. The following 
articles give the examples of the Bronze Night as it was viewed in the Russian media. 
 
The editorial by Vladimir Sungorkin (2007) in the Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya 
Pravda on May 1, 2007 condemned the relocation and reflected the opinion of the 
Russian political elite: ―It is necessary to begin a boycott against everything which is 
connected to Estonia. A boycott against the actions which they [Estonians] make against 
our soldiers. Mere protesting is not enough‖ (Sungorkin 2007). According to the article, 
the Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip, who was in charge of the relocation, became 
―a political dead body‖ (ibid.). The article referred to the Estonian sociologist Juhan 
Kiviräkh, who asserted that the riots and looting were intentionally provoked by the 
prime minister to discredit the protectors of the monument. Thus, the article clearly 
sympathized with the resisting group of the Estonian Russian community, justified their 
 80 
 
actions, and promoted resistance. The actions of the Estonian government were viewed 
as erroneous. At the same time looting and fighting with the police was ignored. 
 
The editorial in the Russian newspaper Itogi on April 30, 2007 demonstrated the same 
tendency. For instance, the author of the article used the word ―destruction‖ instead of 
―relocation‖ while describing the beginning of the events, while the actions of the police 
were called ―purge‖. The article stated that ―on April, 26 the police SWAT violently 
purged the protestors from the territory near the monument of the Warrior-liberator‖ 
(Dybskiy 2007). Then it continued with an obviously false claim that ―at the same time 
the authorities began its [the monument] destruction‖ (ibid.). Although the article 
recognized that cases of vandalism actually took place during the Bronze Night, it 
viewed resisting Russians as protesters rather than looters. The article also referred to 
the archives of the Red Army to prove that the Soviet soldiers, who were criticized and 
discredited in Estonia, were in fact war heroes. Thus, the actions of the Estonian 
government were again interpreted as unfair and unjust, and the riots were viewed as a 
justifiable reaction on the part of offended and enraged Russians. 
 
On the whole, the Russian media continued promoting resistance identity and used the 
topic of the relocation as a further proof that integration was impossible. The only way 
to protect Russian culture and its values among the Estonian Russians was resistance 
and the support of the Russian Federation. A peaceful solution of the problem was not 
even discussed in the articles, and their general mood was aggressive and conspicuously 
one-sided. The street battles were viewed as something good, while the government 
actions in maintaining security were perceived as cruel. Predictably, the Estonian media 
provided an almost equally one-sided picture of the incident; the only difference was 
that they viewed the resistance as something bad and justified the relocation. 
 
On April 28, 2007, two days after the riots Merit Kolli‘s editorial was published in the 
Estonian newspaper Postimees. The article defined all Russian protesters against the 
relocation as ―looters and thieves‖. The riots were ―the mass destruction and looting of 
others‘ property‖ (Kolli 2007). Moreover, it was emphasized that the Bronze Night 
demonstrated that the Estonian Russians were not loyal to Estonia at all: ―The stranger 
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showed his new face, or more exactly the forgotten old face. It was not a soldier or a 
civilian. It was a true Russian hooligan‖ (ibid.). Soviet history and the war monument 
were harshly criticized by the article; the annual Russian meetings near the Bronze 
soldier on May 9 were called ―clownery‖ (ibid.). The article furthermore claimed that 
the hooligans were supported by the Russian media. The reasons for the resistance were 
not even paid attention to. Thus, the articles of such a type could promote only the 
resistance tendencies of Estonian Russian identity since they denied everything which 
was considered sacred by Russian culture. When the Great Patriotic war and the Day of 
Victory were viewed as clownery it was not surprising that Estonian Russians would 
resist to society which promoted these views. If all Russians in Estonia were viewed as 
hooligans by the official media, the consequence would be a Russian shift from 
integration. Nevertheless, not all the articles in the Estonian media gave a one-sided 
image of the Bronze Night. 
 
Despite the criticism of the relocation, many Estonian Russians did not approve of the 
riots and the influence of the Russian Federation and used the Estonian media as a 
means to condemn Russia. For instance, the well-known Estonian Russian sportsman 
Anatoli Schmigun condemned the Bronze Night in his interview published in 
Postimees. In his words, ―Russia has provoked a disproportionately big scandal around 
the Bronze soldier‖ (Babin 2007). In his words one can find the negation of Russia – for 
example, he described the extremely poor life of war veterans in the Russian Federation, 
which preferred not to care about them but to ―yell about the monument in a foreign 
land‖ (ibid.). This is an opinion which can demonstrate the position of many Estonian 
Russians, their anger about Russian interference with their life and the consequent riots. 
 
The editorial in Ohtuleht on May 7, 2007 is an example of multi-sided view of the April 
unrest. On the one hand, it recognized that during the riots there were some crimes and 
vandalism committed by the protesters and the unrest resulted in many million euro 
losses (Kroonberg 2007). ―How much will the pile of bronze and stones cost a 
taxpayer? For certain, some ten million euro‖ (ibid.). On the other hand, the article 
criticized the government decision to relocate the monument, which provoked Russians 
to begin a riot and spoiled relations between Estonians and Estonian Russian 
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community: ―Before they started to fence the Bronze soldier in, it already seemed that 
Estonians and Russians were in good relations with each other. But if one gives people 
an aim to fight for, they will fight. And they will choose which side they are on‖ (ibid.). 
 
Thus, the article did not use the simplified image of hooligans, but emphasized that 
those Estonian Russians who were quite normal citizens were provoked to fight. 
Moreover, it proposed the gradual softening of the situation as a means to solve the 
problem. For example, it noted that Estonians had to put up with the Russian meeting on 
May, 9 and not suppress it, since this step would only exacerbate the issue. This article 
was more likely to influence Estonian Russians to stop resistance and begin a dialogue. 
It recognized the value of the Russian Day of Victory and condemned the government 
actions, but also demanded peaceful cooperation in the future. Such articles usually 
influence the construction of resistance in a negative way since they propose a dialogue 
as a more suitable means than resistance. They do not negate Estonian Russians but try 
to make them show their opinion peacefully.  
 
As for the Estonian Russian media, they commonly demonstrated some mixture of 
Estonian and Russian views of the Bronze Night. Some of them criticized Estonian 
actions. On April 28, 2007 the Estonian Russian paper Vesti Dnya published the 
editorial ―Зачем правые старательно обостряют внутреннюю и внешнюю 
обстановку‖ [Why the conservatives thoroughly jeopardize the internal and external 
situation]. According to the paper, the relocation was promoted by the conservatives, 
who wanted to spoil relations with Russia and unite their Estonian electorate over the 
idea of a fight against the internal and external enemies – Estonian Russians and the 
Russian Federation (Vesti Dnya 28.04.2007). The relocation had to create the image of 
enemy and give the conservatives the road to power (ibid.). On the whole, the article 
repeated the assumption of the riots as the provocation of the government and created 
the positive image of Russians protecting the monument. It called the situation of 
worsening the Estonian-Russian relations due to the relocation one which could lead to 
significant economic losses for Estonia. Although the article did not openly proclaim 
the necessity of resistance, one can note that it portrayed that part of Estonian 
community in fairly negative terms, thus driving the identity of Estonian Russians 
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towards the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, some articles of the Estonian Russian 
media criticized both Estonia and Russia. 
 
On May 7, 2007 the Estonian Russian newspaper Vesti nedeli published the editorial, in 
which the actions of both countries were condemned. On the one hand, the article noted 
that the Estonian media had exacerbated the situation by proclaiming that all Russians 
coming to the monument on May 9 and protesting against the relocation were marginals 
and alcoholics.  On the other hand, the Russian media jeopardized the conflict; they 
―cried about the necessity to protect ―our Victory‖ from the ―neo-Nazis‖ (Vesti nedeli 
07.05.2007). Thus, both Russia and Estonia were guilty of the open street battles. 
Nevertheless, this article openly recognized that many hooligans (both Estonians and 
Estonian Russians) used the riots as an opportunity to loot and pillage, but also 
emphasized that the majority of the protesters were not looters. It highlighted the fact 
that the relocation did not mean the failure of integration, and said that Estonians and 
Estonian Russians had to begin a dialogue to restore the lost mutual trust: ―We should 
find people who are respected by both sides of the split society. It is vital to persuade 
these people to represent us to restore the lost trust. It will be very difficult but it is 
necessary‖. Thus, some Estonian media avoided using the relocation and the Bronze 
Night as an opportunity to promote resistance identity but conversely tried to solve the 
conflict peacefully and supported the project identity of the people who desired peace in 
society.  
 
On the whole, the media during the riots demonstrated three main views. Firstly, one 
view perceived the Estonian Russian community as the looters and marginals, and the 
riots as provocation by the Russian Federation. This view was expressed by a part of the 
Estonian media. At the same time they proclaimed that integration had failed and noted 
that Russians would never be loyal to Estonia. Secondly, a proportion of the Russian 
and Estonian Russian media blamed Estonia for the relocation as act of provocation and 
supported those who resisted. In some cases the media recognized the facts of looting 
but mainly it viewed the protesters in a positive way. These media tried to persuade 
Estonian Russians to build their cultural identity on the principles of resistance to the 
forces which offended Russian culture and history. Thirdly, some Estonian and Estonian 
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Russian media reflected the view that both Estonians and Estonian Russians were guilty 
of the riots. Nevertheless, these media drew attention to the necessity to begin a 
dialogue and to restore the mutual trust. They promoted project identity by emphasizing 
the loyalty of Estonian Russians and the previous years of peaceful coexistence.  
 
In the 1990s a proportion of Russians living in Estonia (especially the younger 
generation) transformed their cultural identity. They chose the way of building the 
Estonian Russian project identity. Today they have adapted to the new conditions and 
are trying to find a better place in Estonian society. The older generation misses the 
high status of Russian culture and considers the Soviet Union to be the motherland, 
while for young people who were born in independent Estonia their only motherland is 
Estonia. Estonian culture is the culture of their motherland.  
 
Project identity is built on the basis of available cultural materials by the social actors 
who want to transform their position in society and the whole social structure; this type 
of identity suits the situation of the transformation of Estonian Russian cultural identity. 
The available cultural materials for Estonian Russians are the elements of both the 
Estonian and Russian cultures (language, history, patterns of behavior): these elements 
are united to form Estonian Russian cultural identity. By identifying themselves with 
Estonian culture some Russians demonstrate that they are different from the Soviet-
period Russians or Russians from the Russian Federation. They demonstrate their 
loyalty to Estonia as their homeland and fight the stereotypes that Estonian Russians are 
the fifth column of the Kremlin. Nevertheless, these Estonian Russians‘ project identity 
has met difficulties in being somewhere in the middle between the cultures. 
 
Those Estonian Russians who are creating their project identity face also some 
problems with their position between two cultures – in some cases they are not accepted 
either by Estonians or Russians. On the one hand, when many Estonian Russians come 
to the Russian Federation they are not perceived as Russians. For Russians they are 
aliens and foreigners (Russkiy portal 2009). They commonly do not know Russian 
culture and history as well as Russians, and even their Russian differs from the language 
spoken in the Russian Federation (Ibid.). When young Estonian Russians wish to apply 
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to a Russian university, they inevitably have to study more about Russian history to pass 
the exams.  
 
On the other hand, for Estonians Estonian Russians often remain Russians, and are 
viewed with suspicion. The tendency to change names proves evidence that, even if a 
person is a loyal citizen, speaks fluent Estonian, respects Estonian culture and considers 
the country to be the motherland, but has a Russian name, they will not be viewed as 
compatriots by Estonians. This phenomenon is not positive and demonstrates that there 
remains tension between the minority and the dominant population. Some Estonians 
express the opinion that Russians in Estonia are people without motherland (Burlakov 
2010). According to them, ―Russians do not feel that Estonia is their motherland, and 
know that Russia will not recognize them [as the compatriots]. The local Russians will 
never be able to live in Russia‖ (ibid.). On the one hand, these Russians often feel 
nostalgia towards Russia, but on the other they have got accustomed to the Western 
pattern of life in Estonia and cannot accept life in the Russian Federation due to its 
problems (bribery, corruption, crime).  Thus, sometimes Estonian Russians are not 
perceived positively both by Estonians and Russians, and cannot find the motherland. 
 
Nevertheless, these problems can be solved when some time has passed; Estonian 
Russian cultural identity is not unique in the post-Soviet space. In many former 
republics of the USSR one can notice the same or at least similar processes to those 
which are taking place in Estonia. Some proportion of the Russian population prefers to 
build a cultural identity which will be able to unite the cultures of Russians and the 
dominant nation; these Russians accept the values of non-Russian culture, at the same 
time preserving the values of the Russian one. Similar processes are taking place in 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Ukraine and other republics (Laitin 1998: 159). Some proportion of 
the local Russian community try to emphasize their difference from Russians in the 
Russian Federation, express loyalty to the national traditions and ways of life, and adapt 
and integrate into non-Russian society (ibid. 159–160). Their Russian culture has 
shifted towards the national culture of these countries (ibid. 159). The younger 
generation, which has not been influenced by the ideology of the Soviet Union, is 
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typically the forefront of the new cultural identity building advocates (ibid.). The future 
will show the further fate of this cultural identity in the post-Soviet countries. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This research has studied the transformations of Estonian Russians‘ cultural identity 
after the fall of the USSR and paid special attention to the way this cultural identity has 
been manifested and constructed through the media. As the main theoretical framework 
of my work I chose the tripartite notion of legitimizing, resistance and project identity 
by Manuel Castells, and Bernhard Giesen‘s concept of the media as identity constructor. 
Manfred Beller‘s theory of image, and Stuart Hall‘s notion of cultural identity were 
chosen as supportive theories. The primary materials of the research were the media 
materials of Estonia, the Russian Federation and the Estonian Russian community. 
 
Castells‘ tripartite categorisation worked well and suited the situation of Estonian 
Russians‘ cultural identity, although according to Castells this division is used to 
distinguish various forms of social identity. For instance, he notes that legitimizing 
identity is established by the dominant institutions of a society to extend and rationalize 
its domination vis-à-vis social actors, while in this work I used the term to refer to 
Soviet Russians‘ dominant position and viewed them as this dominant institution. I used 
this tripartite categorisation as applicable in the cultural sphere since the same qualities 
of three categories of identity can belong also to cultural identity. Giesen‘s notion of the 
media worked well, although it presumes the construction of a nation‘s cultural identity 
via the media rather than the cultural identity of a minority. Nevertheless, the work 
demonstrated that even a minority in an unfriendly environment can use its own media 
in the same manner as a nation in order to construct and protect its cultural identity. 
  
The study first drew attention to the history of the Russian minority in Estonia in the 
pre-Soviet period. Russians established their first settlement in the country in the 11th 
century. In 1721 Estonia became a part of the Russian Empire. Although the imperial 
authorities took some russification measures, the Russian influence on the dominant 
Estonian culture was not as significant as in the Soviet era. The Russian minority in the 
pre-Soviet period was dispersed and heterogeneous and did not have a single cultural 
identity. The beginning of the Soviet presence in Estonia in 1940 changed the situation. 
 88 
 
The study focused on the history of Soviet Estonia and demonstrated how the 
legitimizing identity of Estonian Russians was constructed. According to M. Castells‘ 
categorisation, this type of identity is introduced by the dominant institution or group to 
extend and rationalize its domination. Russian migration from the USSR brought a new 
Russian population, which replaced the existing community. This group became the 
dominant group of Estonian society, and the Communist Party took measures to extend 
and rationalize their governance, thus making the newcomers‘ identity dominant. Pre-
Soviet Estonian culture was criticized by Soviet leaders and some of its figures purged, 
while Russian culture was promoted by a variety of measures. Russians in Estonia had 
an identity based on the image of Russians as benefactors. Then in the 1990s, after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, their cultural identity drastically changed as a result of the 
revival of Estonian culture higher status. 
 
This work touched upon the issue of post-Soviet Estonian cultural policy and its 
influence on Russian identity. In the 1990s the Estonian government tried to protect the 
nation‘s dominant culture and guarantee its high status. Estonian became the only 
official language, and the national history was reviewed. At the same time the 
authorities began the programs of non-Estonians‘ integration and learning. As a result of 
these measures Russians lost their dominant status and met the necessity to change their 
cultural identity. The consequent changes can be systematized according to Castells‘ 
theory on project and resistance identity. 
 
The study analyzed the evolution of an Estonian Russian identity. The research revealed 
that the first years in sovereign Estonia were extremely hard for the minority of 
Russians since they felt some form of identity vacuum. Under such circumstances, 
Russians had to take some measures to eliminate this lack of cultural identification, to 
reassess themselves and their culture. The work suggested that the elder generation‘s 
actions of establishing their cultural identity in post-Soviet Estonia could be defined as 
the measures of constructing resistance identity. Their identity appears to have been 
strongly based on nothing but opposition to the dominant Estonian culture. This identity 
was manifested through some Estonian Russian and almost all the Russian media as the 
only right way of reaction to the policy of Estonianisation and integration while the 
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Estonian media criticized it as very suspicious something opposing sovereign Estonian 
culture.  
 
At the same time the study revealed that many Estonian Russians, especially younger 
generation, created another cultural identity which belonged to the concept of project 
identity in Manuel Castells‘ categorisation. This identity was based on the desire to 
redefine their position in Estonian society by accepting Estonianisation and integration, 
and also to redefine the society itself. Many Estonian Russian and some proportion of 
the Estonian media manifested project identity as different from the purely Russian 
cultural identity; it was viewed as Estonian Russian rather than only Russian, as some 
identity which intermingled the elements of both cultures. I argue that the aim of this 
project identity can be a creation of some new legitimizing identity which could be a 
combination of Estonian and Estonian Russian cultural identity, and this new identity 
can dominate in Estonian society. 
 
According to the study, the media of the Russian Federation admitted that there were 
Estonian or Baltic Russians who drastically differed from Russians living in Russia. 
Interestingly, for the Russian Federation Estonian Russian cultural identity was a source 
of concern. It was portrayed as eroding Russian cultural identity while the Estonian 
state perceived it with enthusiasm and expressed hope that this identity would help to 
solve the conflict between Estonians and Russians in the land. The Russian media 
concentrated mainly on those Russians who embraced resistance identity; the media not 
only reflected the situation with them but also promoted the way of resistance by 
emphasizing the superior character of Russian culture and criticizing Estonian cultural 
policy. 
 
On the whole, the study systematized the changes of Estonian Russian minority self-
identification within the framework of Manuel Castells‘ theory and revealed two kinds 
of Russian cultural identity transformation towards the construction of resistance and 
project identity. The analysis of the media materials demonstrated that both types of 
identity were manifested and constructed through the Estonian, Russian and Estonian 
Russian mass media. The media influence was very significant: it was a means of 
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identity recognition, reflected the opinions on the process of identity construction, and 
accepted or negated one‘s particular cultural identity.  
 
The research also revealed that in the 2000s the new models of Estonian Russians‘ 
identity have their own problems. The resistance identity in Estonia faces difficulties 
due to its opposition to the dominant culture and close relations with the Russian 
Federation; the Estonian media define Russians with resistance identity as the fifth 
column of Russia. On the other hand, the research found out that those Russians who 
identify themselves with Estonian Russians are viewed by Estonians with suspicion, and 
the split between them still exists. The problem has not yet been solved, as not much 
time has passed since the restoration of Estonian independence. Those who were born in 
sovereign Estonia are quite young, and cannot yet influence society as much as they 
wish. Nevertheless, I feel that the future will belong to those who have chosen the way 
of the Estonian Russian identity, since in the coming decades they will be adults, and it 
is to be hoped that Estonians will meet Russian people who will be able to speak the 
official language fluently, know Estonian culture well, and share its values. According 
to the Estonian Russian press, the new culture of Estonian Russians can be a 
convergence of the parallel worlds – the combination of both Estonian and Russian 
cultures – and the new cultural identity should be based on respect towards the 
dominant culture. The next decades will demonstrate the fate of Russians in Estonia. 
 
This study drew attention to some new avenues of research – the evolution of Russians‘ 
cultural identity in post-Soviet space, their adaptation or resistance to the new 
conditions, their relations with the local population and the Russian Federation, and the 
role of the media in Estonian Russians‘ self-identification. One of the promising ways 
of the new research is to survey some general tendency of Russians‘ life in the former 
republics of the USSR after its collapse, some general tendency of their cultural identity 
development, and the influence of their media on that development. The presence of 
significant Russian minorities in the former republics of the Soviet Union is a fact of 
life, and therefore these minorities can be thoroughly studied in order to ease the tension 
between Russians and the local population. 
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Евгений Ашихмин 
Сближение параллельных миров 
Эстонская и русская культура в Эстонии — словно параллельные миры. Они связаны, но и 
отклоняются друг от друга. Еще много непонимания, предубеждений. Но не будем 
драматизировать. Благодаря просветительской деятельности Ингрид Эрилайд, ее коллег и других 
подвижников, благодаря стремлению самих эстонских литераторов построить мосты доверия 
нарвитяне и жители других регионов имеют прекрасную возможность знакомиться с 
разнообразным миром литературы и, что особенно важно для русского читателя, — с современной 
эстонской классикой. Такие добрые встречи, откровенные диалоги дают возможность народам 
лучше узнать друг друга, сближают их. 
 
 
Babin, Andrei (2007). ―Anatoliy Shmigun: Ya Estosnkiy Russkiy.‖ Postimees. 
05.12.2007 [Cited 14.11.2010]. Available at: 
http://rus.postimees.ee/020708/dopolnitelno/den_rozhdenija/26463_1.php 
Андрей Бабин 
Анатолий Шмигун: Я эстонский русский 
Случались ли вам, русскому, дискутировать с эстонцами, среди которых живете, на 
неспортивные темы? Тот же Бронзовый солдат...  
Да, я русский, за тридцать с лишним лет жизни среди эстонцев так и не обэстонился. И никогда не 
стремился к этому. Но чувствую, что я уже не тот русский, что живут в России. Я — здешний, 
эстонский русский. А насчет Бронзового солдата вот что скажу. Россия подняла неадекватный 
шум из-за него. Я 9 Мая звонил сестре — мол, как празднуете? А она мне: «Толик, какой там 
праздник, когда в кошельке 80 рублей?» Я, когда приезжаю, долги ее оплачиваю, закупаю, что 
могу. Вчера звонил, и опять тяжко на душе. Болею, говорит, а денег нет на лекарства. Вот так 
живет провинция в России, а сколько воплей по поводу памятника в другой стране...  
 
Boltova, Valeria (2010). ‖Russkih v Estonii spaset segregatsiya.‖ In Vesti. 24.03.2010. 
[Cited 6.11.2010]. Available at: http://www.vesti.ee/litsnie/18770/ 
Мнение: русских в Эстонии спасет сегрегация 
Для того, чтобы выжить и сохранить свои национальные особенности и культуру, русским в 
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Эстонии нужно отгородиться от эстонцев большим забором, который позволит существовать 
параллельно. 
Как считает Валерия Болтова, ожидать от эстонского государства заботы об иных, кроме 
эстонских, культур, языков и народов, не приходится, а это значит, что эстонским русским 
придется самостоятельно заботиться о сохранении своей идентичности. 
 
 
Chernov, Michail (2004). ―Baltiyskie Russkie ne hotyat byt ‖negrami‖. ‖ RBK Daily. 
28.04.2004. [Cited 17.11.2010]. Available at: 
http://www.rbcdaily.ru/archive/2004/04/28/54350 
Михаил Чернов 
Балтийские русские не хотят быть «неграми» 
Большинство русскоязычных не испытывают особых симпатий к России, выступают за 
скорейшую интеграцию своих республик в Евросоюз и намерены активно участвовать в 
политической жизни единой Европы.  
Фактическое угнетение русскоязычных продолжается, несмотря на то, что большинство русского 
населения ориентировано на интеграцию ЕС и вполне патриотично настроено по отношению к 
своим республикам. «Местные русские поддерживают идею независимости от России. Между тем, 
бывая у нас, бизнесмены из Прибалтики видят, что бизнес их защищен от произвола силовиков и 
государства, чего нет в России», – говорит г-н Собянин. Во многом именно поэтому они 
связывают свое будущее не с Россией, а с Евросоюзом. 
Парадокс состоит в том, что балтийские русские, по сути, являются большими европейцами по 
духу, чем, собственно, прибалтийские народы.  
 
 
 
Denisov, Rodion (2010). ―Otkrytoe Pismo Predsedatelju ILR Martu Laaru.‖ Narvskaja 
Gazeta. 21.01.2010. [Cited 14.11.2010]. Available at: 
http://www.gazeta.ee/index.php?itemid=5148 
Родион Денисов 
Открытое письмо председателю IRL Марту Лаару 
 
Настало время всерьез заняться созиданием ценностей, которые были бы для эстонцев и русских 
общими. 
Одной из таких ценностей могла бы стать наша история, которая знала не только моменты 
отчуждения между нашими народами, но и множество дел, которые эстонцы и русские делали 
сообща во имя единых целей. Почему русские и эстонцы в последние десятилетия зациклены на 
спорах о событиях 1940 года? Разве ничего другого в истории не было? 
Давайте вспомним события Освободительной войны, которые дороги для каждого патриота 
Эстонии. Почему эстонская историография практически ничего не говорит о тех русских людях, 
которые героически сражались плечом к плечу с эстонцами на заре эстонской независимости в 
рядах эстонской армии? Этими людьми могут и должны гордиться и эстонцы, и русские. 
Вспомним имена эстонцев, которые получили за свою доблестную воинскую службу 
Георгиевские кресты от Российской империи. И подобных примеров в истории Эстонии 
множество. Цели сближения двух общин и поиска единых ценностей мог бы послужить и 
предложенный недавно Аймаром Альтосааром месячник Георгиевских лент, в котором приняли 
бы участие и эстонцы, и русские.  
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Убежден, что необходимо начать при государственной поддержке изучение истории нашего 
государства с позиции того вклада, который внесли в его созидание представители всех 
проживающих в Эстонии народов. Должны появиться соответствующие научные исследования, 
буклеты, учебники, тематические и дискуссионные интернет-сайты и просто публикации в СМИ. 
 
 
Krooming-Suharev, Boris (2002). ―Russkiy MIR: Contury budushego.‖ Molodoj 
Estonii. 18.10.2002. [Cited 6.11.2010]. Available at: 
http://www.moles.ee/02/Oct/18/11-1.php 
Борис Круминг-Сухарев 
Русский МIРЪ: контуры будущего 
А при устойчивой мотивации со стороны России возможно не только сохранение культурного 
наследия, но и его развитие. Основная область интереса для всех – сохранение общей духовности, 
развитие культуры в широком смысле слова. Именно этой проблемой озабочены многие видные 
представители интеллектуальной элиты России, в среде которой все больше прорастает мысль о 
единстве русского Мира. Их поиски и усилия, а также встречная деятельность русских диаспор 
вылились в движение «Русский Мiръ», подчеркивая самим написанием названия смысл 
сообщества. Его стержень – многонациональная русская культура, русский язык, русская духовная 
традиция. Из общности интересов родилось простое предложение: от разделения к совместной 
деятельности. Цель предельно ясна: создание из краха целостности иного рода. 
Главная задача, естественно, не территориальное объединение, а создание единого виртуального 
пространства «Русского Мiра». Мировоззренческое и структурное объединение России и русских 
диаспор, что позволит создать «Русский Мiр», обладающий огромным потенциалом развития. 
Вот что пишет сопредседатель-координатор Международной ассоциации «Русская Культура», 
академик РАЕН Д.И.Ивашинцов: «Именно поэтому, все, кто самоидентифицирует себя в рамках 
русской культуры, где бы они ни находились, к каким бы политическим или географическим 
берегам их ни прибило, должны объединиться вокруг идеи возрождения Русского мiра, мира как 
общности людей одной культуры, одного языка, одного нравственного и духовного императива, 
мира, в котором русский мог бы с гордостью называть себя русским». 
Несомненно одно: с такой опорой мы можем жить в европейском сообществе не только как 
граждане Европы, но и как наследники и носители великой культуры. 
 
Laar, Mart (2009). ‖Estontsam i Russkim nado chastche obschatsa.‖ Postimees. 
29.11.2009. [Cited 14.11.2010]. Available at:  http://rus.postimees.ee/?id=194365 
Март Лаар 
Лаар: Эстонцам и русским надо чаще общаться  
Лаар не исключает, что потомки тех русскоязычных жителей, которые приехали в Эстонию в 
период советской власти, воспринимают как обвинение в свой адрес разговоры об оккупации и 
аннексии Эстонии. «Честно сказать, для эстонцев - это сюрприз. Они не предполагают сами, что 
своими высказываниями они кого-то обвиняют», - сказал Лаар. 
По оценке Лаара, прекращение дискуссий на тему истории не снимет проблем. «Люди по-
прежнему будут считать себя оккупантами и так далее. Причем для эстонцев это не тема, не суть 
жизни, но многие русские, наоборот, живут именно этим и интуитивно считают себя оккупантами 
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даже тогда, когда об этом нет и речи», - сказал Лаар. 
Именно это, по мнению Лаара, и отталкивает большинство русскоязычных жителей от активной 
общественной жизни Эстонии. Он также сказал, что во время предвыборной кампании в его кафе 
приходили русские люди, и дискуссии в основном велись на тему истории. «Они приходили, 
задавали вопросы на тему истории. Мало кого волновали вопросы, связанные с жизнью города. 
Выйти из этого круга мы сможем, лишь общаясь как можно больше», - сказал Лаар. 
 
 
Made, Tiit (2010). ‖Nastuplenie blagosklonnyh k Rossii v Estonii.‖ Ohtuleht. 
18.02.2010. [Cited 18.11.2010]. Available at: 
http://www.inosmi.org/baltic/20100218/158250786.html 
Тиит Маде 
Наступление благосклонных к России в Эстонии 
Эстония после восстановления независимости была все время объектом нападок и давления со 
стороны России. Когда провалились попытки России организовать апрельский мятеж (события, 
связанные с переносом памятника Воину-освободителю Таллина от фашистов в апреле 2007 года - 
Х.С.) и здешняя пятая колонна, несмотря на иностранное руководство, оказалась беспомощной, 
там, где нужно, быстро переориентировались. Где нельзя справиться силой, нужно помочь 
советом. Нужно было существенно расширить ставшую осторожной команду, формирующую  
мнение среди здешних про-российских сил.  
Тоталитарное наступление про-российских сил бросается в глаза при обсуждении  вопроса о 
необходимости президента отправиться в Москву.  
 
 
Mauzer, Aleksandr (2009). ‖Kladbishe Narvskoi Istorii.‖ Narvskaja Gazeta. 
28.10.2009. [Cited 14.11.2010]. Available at: 
http://www.gazeta.ee/index.php?itemid=4710 
Александр Маузер 
Кладбище нарвской истории  
Без прошлого, как говорится, нет будущего. Солидная часть нашего, то есть нарвского 
прошлого бесследно исчезает на территории сопредельного государства.... 
Многие памятники нарвской истории находятся на правом берегу реки, и до их судьбы, увы, 
никому нет дела. 
Парусинка — часть единого архитектурного комплекса конца 19 начала 20 века постройки, в 
который входили район Кренгольм вместе с фабриками и жилыми домами, а также Воскресенским 
собором и Александровской церковью. То, что мы увидели — это пустые глазницы окон 
ресторана в знаменитом круглом здании с колоннами, из которых на нас глазела ивангородская 
детвора. Для нас, формальных европейцев, зрелище было шокирующим. 
В свое время в Нарве на старое кладбище в Сийвертси, на Гарнизонное кладбище, где похоронены 
воины, воевавшие на стороне Эстонии в Освободительной войне, на кладбище Печорского полка, 
кладбище политзаключенных из ИТЛ, где сейчас расположена гребная база, первыми обратили 
свое внимание энтузиасты, которые начали тормошить спонсоров и власти, чтобы привести эти 
места захоронений в порядок. За них более не стыдно, а вот за ивангородское кладбище — 
наоборот. 
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Юрий Моисеенко 
Слово «русский» в Эстонии теперь считается синонимом маргинала. 
В самом деле трудно объяснять восемнадцатилетнему, среднестатистическому студенту из такого 
же среднестатистического города Энска, что его язык, его культура, его образ мыслей в Европе, 
которая, как нас порой уверяют, остается оплотом демократии, находятся под запретом. Слово 
«русский» теперь считается у нас чуть ли не синонимом – маргинала. Зато есть задача по 
уничтожению русского мира (во всяком случае, на территории современной Балтии) и, судя по 
этим статистическим данным, она успешно выполняется. В настоящее время в Эстонии проживает 
до 300 тысяч граждан, для которых русский язык считается родным. Однако можно ли считать их 
этническими русскими, если сегодня все, чтобы выставить их людьми без родины, без культуры - 
без той национальной почвы, которая делает русского русским. 
- Если эта политика этнического геноцида продлится еще лет 15-20, - высказал свою точку зрения 
Линтер, - то ее итоги будет более чем печальны: мы получим самую настоящую идеологическую 
«пятую» колонну. Не русских, а именно русскоговорящих при этом ненавидящих все, чем 
гордиться Россия. 
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Сергей Орлов 
Президент Эстонии считает язык Пушкина... языком зверств 
В республике придумывают изощренные ходы, чтобы вытеснить русское 
население на обочину жизни 
Думается, причина все-таки в другом. Ту самую лояльность стремятся проявить многие директора 
и педагоги, потому что государство жестко насаждает эстонский язык в русские школы и карает за 
«нелояльность».  
Но власти решают задачу кардинальнее. Работу по вытеснению русского языка решено начать 
чуть ли не с грудных младенцев. В министерстве образования и науки обсуждают планы перевода 
на эстонский язык... русскоязычных детских садов.  
Русский язык в Эстонии уже как приговор. Без идеального знания государственного не 
устроишься на работу и во многие частные структуры. Просто знать эстонский мало – нужно 
сдать экзамен, а преодолеть этот барьер все труднее. 
С другой стороны, за 50 лет советского периода, который Тоомас Хендрик Ильвес назвал 
«зверствами», эстонский язык не только не умер, но и получил развитие и поддержку. В 1947 году 
был создан Институт эстонского языка и литературы при Академии Наук Эстонии. В 50-е 
«советские оккупанты» спрособствовали организации грандиозных праздников эстонских песни и 
танца. Никто не препятствовал развитию эстонской литературы, кинематографа. Практически вся 
элита республики, многие представители которой вышли из деревни и в буржуазной Эстонии не 
имели шанса на образование, закончила советские вузы. 
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Урве Пало 
Интеграция начинается с молодых  
 
Доверие между представителями разных народов растет, если они постоянно вместе. Бывший 
министр по делам народонаселения Урве Пало считает, что если русские и эстонские дети будут 
иметь возможность больше времени проводить вместе, то это обещает для нас в будущем более 
толерантное общество. 
Мы же в Эстонии, похоже, все еще находимся там, где Америка была полвека назад. Мы, конечно, 
гордимся тем, что молодые эстонские русские говорят на эстонском языке все лучше, но при этом 
не обращаем внимания на тот факт, что большинство эстоноязычных и русскоязычных молодых 
людей фактически не соприкасаются друг с другом. 
Чтобы в Эстонии росло доверие между разными национальностями, мы каждый день должны 
соприкасаться, общаться — и я говорю не о нескольких секундах в магазине, когда мы покупаем 
продукты. 
Начинать нужно с молодежи. Последние исследования показывают, что порядка 60% как 
эстонцев, так и эстонских русских хотят, чтобы их дети вместе ходили в эстоноязычные детские 
садики. 
В то же время у русскоязычных детей должна быть возможность углубленного изучения русского 
языка и русской культуры. Для них участие в уроках русского с детьми, для которых родным 
языком является эстонский, едва ли будет интересным. Желание же сохранить свой родной язык и 
культуру является вполне понятным и похвальным.  
 
 
Raun, Alo (2010). ―Ekspert: Prozyabanie russkih partiy govorit ob integratsii.‖ 
Postimees. 29.01.2010. [Cited 15.11.2010]. Available at: 
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Ало Раун 
Эксперт: Прозябание русских партий говорит об интеграции  
 
Социолог Иви Проос считает, что об интеграции лучше всего говорит то, что русскоязычные 
граждане Эстонии не выбирают в Рийгикогу «своих».  
 «По моему видению, это же показывают исследования и анализ: русскоязычные или созданные по 
национальному признаку партии после восстановления независимости Эстонии не имели успеха. 
Причина здесь очень проста – русскоязычные избиратели не оказывают «своим» достаточной 
поддержки и не избирают их в парламент», - сказала Проос Postimees.ee.  
 «Следовательно, эстонские русские систематически выбирают те партии, которые сейчас 
присутствуют в Рийгикогу. Если это поведение – не интеграция, то тогда что?», - спрашивает 
Проос. 
По ее словам, процесс интеграции протекает в различных регионах Эстонии по-разному. В 
небольших городах, где русских мало, они, владея эстонским языком, интегрированы в эстонскую 
общину, и воспринимаются последней как свои. 
 
 
 
 103 
 
Samarina, Aleksandra (2009). ―Istoria Umolchaniya.‖ Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 
12.02.2009. [Cited 14.11.2010]. Available at: http://www.ng.ru/cis/2009-12-
02/2_story.html 
Александра Самарина 
История умолчания 
Школьные учебники ближнего зарубежья искореняют общую память 
народов  
Вывод авторов доклада: за исключением Беларуси и Армении, страны постсоветского 
пространства вместо объективного изложения исторических событий преподносят школьникам 
гремучую смесь из мифов по поводу древности своего народа, высокой культурной миссии 
предков и «заклятом враге» – России.  
Шадрин приводит в пример трактовку периода шведского господства в эстонских учебниках в 
самых позитивных тонах. Хотя, указывает ученый, «именно при шведах, в ХVII веке, от голода, 
чумы и войн погибло четыре пятых населения. Это взято из эстонского энциклопедического 
словаря...».  
И еще одна общая деталь, отмеченная в исследовании российских ученых: упорно замалчиваются 
выгоды, которые получали сопредельные республики в рамках СССР. Из текста исключены все 
события, которые можно трактовать как благоприятные плоды совместного существования.  
 
 
 
Shurygin, Vladislav (2005). ‖Estonskie zarisovki.‖ Zavtra. 04.05.2005. [Cited 
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Владислав Шурыгин  
ЭСТОНСКИЕ ЗАРИСОВКИ 
РУССКИЕ  
 
И третья часть русской общины — это молодѐжь, которая выросла уже после 1991 года. Для неѐ 
нынешняя Эстония — это еѐ жизнь. Эта часть общины живѐт в Эстонии и принимает мир вокруг 
себя как свой мир и идентифицирует себя с этим миром. Для них Россия лишь некая духовная 
категория, часть истории семьи и культурная традиция.  
По мнению русских, в самые трудные и тяжѐлые годы Россия просто "кинула" своих 
соплеменников и предала их. И это чувство "национального сиротства" определяет отношение к 
нынешней России. От полного разочарования и даже полного отторжения России — особенно в 
среде "выживающих", многие из которых откровенно обижены и злы на Россию, "предавшую" их, 
до спокойного и даже гордого: "а мы всѐ равно живѐм!"  
Русские здесь привыкли обходиться без поддержки "исторической родины", привыкли полагаться 
сами на себя. .  
 
 
Toom, Jana (2008). ―Maxim Reva: My umyvaem ruki.‖ Stolitsa. 17.11.2008. [Cited 
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Яна Тоом 
Максим Рева: Мы умываем руки 
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— Примерно треть населения Эстонии связывают общие история и культура.  И то что сейчас 
происходит в отношении этих общих истории и культуры, я бы назвал культурным геноцидом.  
 
 — Мы объединены, я бы так сказал, общей трактовкой истории. Я никогда не смогу согласиться с 
тем, что мой дедушка был оккупантом. Точно так же я никогда не смогу согласиться с тем, что 
люди, которые надевали мундир СС, боролись за свою свободу. И с этим, я уверен, не может 
согласиться еще 350 тысяч русских в Эстонии.  
 
— Это как раз то, о чем я говорю — культурный геноцид. Наши дети проходят идеологическую 
обработку.  
 
— Да, мы разные, но один день в году мы вместе, а должны быть вместе 365 дней. Нам надо 
работать с молодежью. Надо вытаскивать молодежь из того мракобесия, которое дает сейчас 
школа. Сейчас у нас есть поддержка со стороны России. Я говорю о таком проекте и фонде, как 
«Русский мир», который финансирует исключительно гуманитарные и исторические проекты. 
 
— А мы не собираемся объединять русских для борьбы за эстонское государство… Русские для 
эстонского государства оказались той прослойкой, которая не нужна. И я уверен, что эстонское 
государство в результате получило огромную массу людей, которым нет до него никакого дела. И 
когда я говорю, что мы не станем ему — государству — помогать, я не имею в виду, что мы будем 
его расшатывать, это, как показывает жизнь, и без нас есть кому сделать. Но мы — умыли руки.  
Однако наш долг, наша обязанность — образовывать своих детей всеми возможными способами. 
Потому что в противном случае еще через 15 лет мы получим 250 тысяч «жвачек». Людей без 
мозгов. Плохорусскоговорящих.  
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Роман Викулов 
Татьяна Степанова: статуса гимназии добивались 10 лет  
То, что у учеников Ваналиннаской школы с эстонским порядок, показал весенний госэкзамен для 
выпускников 9-х классов по эстонскому языку как родному (!). Средний балл по школе был выше, 
чем по республике, то есть 4.0.  
- Есть мнение, что через 10-20 лет все выпускники русских гимназий в Эстонии будут знать 
эстонский очень хорошо. Согласны ли вы с этим?  
- Пожалуй, соглашусь. Часов преподавания эстонского много. И, судя по тому, с какими знаниями 
в наш гимназический класс пришли ребята из обычных школ, это вполне реально.  
- Именно поэтому для нас очень важно изучать культуру, традиции эстонского народа. Но мы 
празднуем и эстонские, и русские праздники. Сохранение русского идентитета для нас 
принципиально. 
 
